The War in Ukraine And Its Fallout: How Russia Manipulated Elections in Moldova and Georgia

The war in Ukraine has greatly impacted major geopolitical structures both regionally and globally. However, its effects on a regional level as a stimulus for the increase of Russian influence are quite context-specific. The threat of a full-scale war, which is a daily reality in Ukraine, has been one of the major manipulative narratives that pro-Russian political forces have utilized in Georgia and Moldova, two post-Soviet countries with strong EU aspirations and an existing Russian military presence in their territory.

In the fall of 2024, Georgia and Moldova held crucial elections(1), during which significant Russian interference was detected. This interference manifested not only through election tampering but also through disinformation campaigns and politically threatening tactics. Over the past three years, hybrid measures—such as disinformation initiatives and intimidating political rhetoric—have significantly impacted not just the elections but also the overall political discourse and dynamics in these countries(2). This article examines the regional repercussions of the war and Russia’s secondary geopolitical objectives, namely its ambition to expand political influence over post-Soviet space and the former socialist bloc.

Georgia’s current leading party, Georgian Dream, has been in power since 2012, and during this long period of time, its geopolitical vector has been subtly and slowly shifting away from the West. The deteriorating relationship became more visible after Russia invaded Ukraine when, despite the strong historical and emotional connection between the Georgian public and Ukraine’s existential struggle, the government chose not to support Ukraine to the extent expected. Furthermore, the Georgian Dream strategy in domestic politics became heavily focused on the so-called “war narrative” - the idea that avoiding any type of tension with Russia is crucial to preventing a Ukraine-like scenario. While an actual military confrontation with Russia was never realistically anticipated, this narrative still helped create a blurry perception of geopolitical contexts and persuade voters that a policy of neutrality was a strategic choice rather than an act of betrayal.

Photo by Element5 Digital on Unsplash

It may seem quite odd, but the Georgian Dream government’s current foreign policy posture is not daring enough to be clearly pro-Russian, because pro-EU and NATO aspirations traditionally have immense support among the Georgian public(3), including Georgian Dream’s voters too.

During the pre-election period, Georgian Dream strategically employed images and narratives to contrast the situations in Georgia and Ukraine. The Georgian government tried to present “peace” as its own political achievement, even though 20% of Georgia’s territory remains occupied by Russia(4). The aggressor regime continues to expand its border and kidnap Georgian citizens(5).

Thus, the Georgian Dream government’s definition of ‘peace’ merely refers to the absence of missile strikes, rather than a truly stable or sovereign state. By framing this as a political success, the government indirectly—and sometimes directly—blamed the current Ukrainian government and Georgia’s previous administration for provoking(6) full-scale wars, even though Russia was clearly the sole aggressor in both cases.

One month before the October 2024 elections, an outdoor advertising campaign featured billboards across the capital, comparing war-torn Ukrainian schools and public spaces to Georgia’s “peaceful” environment with inscriptions: “No to war, choose peace”.

This controversial advertising campaign faced widespread criticism by the Georgian public and European diplomats. The stark comparison did not resonate well, even among Georgian Dream’s own electorate. However, the real goal of the campaign was not to instill a sense of pride but rather to subtly remind the public of the Russian threat. It played on a fundamental human emotion—fear—relying on deep psychological instincts to shape political attitudes.

In October 2024 Moldova also faced a pivotal presidential election, alongside a referendum on the EU accession. In contrast to Georgia, Moldova’s government led by President Maia Sandu, has pursued a firmly pro-EU foreign policy, especially after the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022. Sandu secured victory in the second round of elections facing off against her key political rival, pro-Russian populist Alexandr Stoianoglo. However, the EU referendum result(7) was much narrower, with Sandu’s pro-Western bloc winning by just 50.4%.

During election day, the exceptionally high turnout among the Moldovan diaspora(8) in foreign electoral districts played a decisive role in the referendum outcome. Notably, disruptive incidents, such as fake bomb threats, targeted electoral districts in Liverpool, Northampton, Frankfurt, and Kaiserslautern, delaying the voting process(9).

Nearly 300,000 Moldovan citizens participated in both rounds of elections, whereas in Georgia, the organization, planning, and accessibility of foreign electoral districts were notably poor. As a result, only 34,000 Georgian citizens participated in these crucial elections(10). 

Moldova’s Minister of European Integration Cristina Gherasimov, revealed in an interview(11) with POLITICO, that authorities detected an unprecedented level of Russian interference, including cyberattacks on public institutions such as airports and post offices, as well as vote-buying and direct financial incentives provided to local proxies to destabilize the situation. The National Security Advisor to the President of Moldova, Stanislav Secrieru, further stated that Russia organized charter flights and inland transportation for its supporters. Additionally, Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor reportedly spent(12)) nearly $40 million on election manipulation. According to Moldova’s police office, in October 2024 alone, more than $15 million were transferred to citizens’ accounts as part of these operations.

Photo by ALEKO KEZEVADZE on Unsplash

Russia’s primary objective in invading Ukraine in 2022 was to dismantle its democratic regime—either by occupying significant territory or pressuring the government into a regime change. For many Eastern Europeans, Russia’s expansionist ambitions and desire to restore its influence over former Soviet states have long been evident, but the past three years have made them undeniable. Belarus serves as a stark example of the dependent, subordinate state Russia envisions for its neighbors.

Unlike Ukraine, Russia did not require a full-scale military invasion of Belarus, as Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime already operates as a satellite state, fully aligned with Moscow’s interests. Similarly, Russia’s large-scale interference in Moldova’s and Georgia’s recent elections—favoring pro-Russian, anti-democratic candidates—represents another strategic move to erode democratic institutions. Although the methods differ from a military invasion, election manipulation is proving to be a cheaper and subtler alternative to achieving the same geopolitical objectives.

The ongoing U.S.-brokered peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia carry significant implications for the democratic future not only of Ukraine but also of Georgia and Moldova. Any potential outcome—including possible territorial concessions by Ukraine—will likely be weaponized by Russia-affiliated forces in Georgia and Moldova to reinforce the “war narrative.” Such a scenario would paint a picture of Ukraine as a nation deceived and defeated by the West, serving as a cautionary tale for other post-Soviet countries. The implicit message would be clear: abandoning democratic and pro-Western aspirations is the only way to avoid Ukraine’s fate and hand over sovereignty to their “Big Brother.”

Bibliography

1- Eaglestone, Amy. (31.10.2024), ‘’Russia is meddling in politics in Georgia and Moldova – Trying to Do by Stealth What It Is Doing by War In Ukraine’’. Available at The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/russia-is-meddling-in-politics-in-georgia-and-moldova-trying-to-do-by-stealth-what-it-is-doing-by-war-in-ukraine-242135. (Accessed: March 2025)

2- Harvey, Anna. (20.03.2025), ‘’Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare: Elections in Moldova and Georgia’’. Available at War Room Online Journal, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/russian-hybrid-warfare/. (Accessed: March 2025)

3- Annual Survey 2024: Georgia, Available at EUNEIGHBOURSEAST, https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/publications/annual-survey-2024-georgia/. (Accessed: March 2025)

4- Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories Consolidated versions (17/07/2015 - 06/06/2018), Available at Legislative Herald of Georgia, https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/19132?publication=6. (Accessed: March 2025)

5- Sulakauri, Daro. (08.12.2022), ‘’Bordering Georgia's Breakaway Regions, Villagers Fear Russia's Next Steps’’. Available at Reuters, https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/bordering-georgias-breakaway-regions-villagers-fear-russias-next-steps. (Accessed: March 2025)

6- https://tabula.ge/ge/news/702026-gharibashvili-omze-ert-erti-mizezi-iqo-ukrainis

7- Statista Research Derpartment. (21.01.2025), ‘’Results of the presidential election in the first round in Moldova on October 20 and November 3, 2024’’. Available at Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1499169/moldova-presidential-election-results/. (Accessed: March 2025)

8- Citre, Critsi. (04.11.2024), ‘’ Rezultate alegeri R. Moldova. Maia Sandu a Câștigat cu 82% în Diaspora. În Găgăuzia, Stoianoglo a Primit 97% Din Voturi’’. Available at Digi 24, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/moldova/rezultate-alegeri-r-moldova-maia-sandu-a-castigat-cu-82-in-diaspora-in-gagauzia-stoianoglo-a-primit-97-din-voturi-2992963. (Accessed: March 2025)

9- Dinger, Alexander. Pfahler, Lennart, Röhn, Tim. (02.11.2024), ‘’Moldova Warns of Russian ‘Disruptive’ Moves Against Overseas Voting in Sunday’s Runoff’’. Available at POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/moldova-eu-referendum-vote-russian-interference-enlargement-accession/ (Accessed: 18.04.2025)

10- Election Administration of Georgia, https://results.cec.gov.ge/#/en-us/election_57/tr/prop/unit/0. (Accessed: March 2025)

11- Gavin, Gabriel. (17.10.2024), ‘’Moldova Faces ‘Existential’ EU Vote in Face of Russian Interference’’. Available at POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/moldova-eu-referendum-vote-russian-interference-enlargement-accession/.  (Accessed: March 2025)    

12- Kirby, Paul. (04.11.2024), ‘’Pro-EU leader wins Moldova Election Despite Alleged Russian Meddling’’. Available at BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz7w9dglzzlo. (Accessed: March 2025)

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