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Russia, The US, and The Irony of Spheres of Influence

  • Writer: J. S. Feral
    J. S. Feral
  • Jul 25, 2025
  • 13 min read

“What would the US do if Russia made a military alliance with Mexico or Canada?” Ever since Russia’s full‑scale invasion of Ukraine, this rhetorical argument has been made across the media spectrum, from Laco (2022) at Fox News to Marcetic (2022) in Jacobin and Chomsky (2023) in The New Statesman.  It is a weak whataboutism meant to distract from or justify Russia’s actions. However, it also speaks to a deeper perception of world order. One that leans into the logic of empires—dividing the world into spheres of influence where major powers reign over their neighbors with a might-makes-right justification. While this mentality has lingered on, propped up by leaders and commentators, it is neither inevitable nor advantageous. 


Russia is actively involved throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and has been increasingly involved since 2014. It has economic ties and military alliances with many US neighbors. It maintains a military and intelligence presence and runs an effective anti-US propaganda campaign throughout the region. As of yet, the US has not responded to these “provocations” by invading, and nor should it. Assuming a sphere of influence might provide short-term benefits, but ultimately it will breed resistance, chaos, and greater insecurity. 


The Russians Have Arrived

Thirty years after withdrawing from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has made a comeback. Today, Russia has a multi-faceted relationship with the region, anchored in diplomacy, trade, security, and hearts and minds. 



Russia has become LAC's one-stop shop for oil, fertilizer, and arms. Unsurprisingly, Russia is a major regional oil supplier, delivering hundreds of thousands of barrels of crude daily. It also supplies 22% of Latin America’s fertilizer (EPRS, 2014), along with a notable amount of the region’s arms, including fighter jets, air defense, naval platforms, tanks, and surface-to-air missiles. Russia is also heavily involved in the region's energy sector. From nuclear energy to lithium mining and deep-sea drilling, Russia has invested billions of dollars into research and development. Countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, Cuba, and Ecuador, are dependent on Russia for their agricultural, energy, and/or military needs (CSD, 2024). A dependency that Russia has, at times, utilized as a strategic bargaining tool.


In 2023, the US petitioned Ecuador to give Ukraine its old Soviet weapons in exchange for new US-made models. Ecuador agreed. In response, Russia restricted banana imports from Ecuador. After a month Ecuador pulled out of the US deal (Reuters, 2024). 

War Games

Not one to limit itself to soft power, in 2008, Russia sent two nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela—then proceeded to fly training missions over the region. The bombers were followed by a Russian naval flotilla which conducted military exercises in the Caribbean (Reuters, 2008). Again in 2018-19, Russia sent bombers to Venezuela along with several S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, which conveniently came with a side of military experts. Later in 2019, planes full of Russian soldiers landed near Caracas (Bellingcat, 2019). The soldiers were then employed as President Maduro’s personal security. In 2024, men wearing the Russian Wagner Group’s insignia were also spotted among Maduro’s security (Intellinews, 2024).


While there are Russians in Venezuela, there are more in Nicaragua, where Russian troops, aircraft, and ships are allowed to operate freely (AP, 2022). Russia maintains a rotation of about 230 troops in Nicaragua, they participate in military exercises and assist in counter-narcotic operations. Nicaragua also hosts a training center operated by Russian officers and participates in an exchange programme, regularly sending police and military personnel to Russia (INSS, 2022).  

Cuba has had a long-standing relationship with Russia. Since the fall of the USSR, the two countries have been friendly but distant, with the occasional Russian military vessel visiting Havana. However, in 2024, Russia sent four warships, aircraft, and a nuclear-powered submarine to Cuba for joint military exercises. A month after the drills were completed, and the Russian fleet departed, another Russian flotilla arrived in Havana. This second, smaller fleet, remained for several months, solidifying the two countries’ rapprochement (PBS, 2024). 


Espionage

Military drills are flashy, but espionage is where the real game is. There have been multiple sightings of Russian submarines in the Gulf of Mexico and Russian spy ships cruising the US coast or docking in Havana. All presumably collecting intelligence on the US. Then there is GLONASS, Russia’s global positioning satellite system run by the Russian Ministry of Defence. GLONASS has been suspected of being used for espionage, data collection, and extortion. Russia has five ground stations in Latin America, and services large swaths of the region, including Mexico (NewLines, 2021).


It is not all ships and satellites, Mexico is a hub of Russian HUMINT operations. Shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the number of Russian employees at the Russian embassy in Mexico went from 42 to 86 (Estavaz, 2024). This increase coincided with European countries ejecting suspected Russian spies en masse. Gen. Glen D. VanHerck testified that there are more GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) officers in Mexico than anywhere else in the world (El País, 2022). From Mexico, the GRU is optimally placed to run operations, meet American assets, and recruit spies.


While the world of espionage is inherently opaque, there are several known accounts of Russian/Soviet intelligence working out of Mexico. Two months before he shot JFK, Oswald visited the Cuban embassy in Mexico, where he is suspected to have met with Soviet and Cuban intelligence agents (BBC, 2017).


A more recent example is Nathan Nicholson, the son of an ex-CIA officer convicted of spying for the Russians. From prison, Nicholson sent his son to collect the money owed to him by the Russian Government. Before he was also caught, Nathan met with Russian agents around the world, but he cut his teeth in Mexico City (FBI, 2009).

Most recently, Mexican scientist Hector Fuentes confessed to committing espionage in Florida. Fuentes had two families, one Mexican living in Mexico and one Russian living in Germany. On a visit to Russia, Fuentes’s Russian wife and children were detained. Russian agents recruited Fuentes with the promise of helping his family get back to Germany. At his handler’s request, Fuentes traveled from Mexico to the US, where he was caught surveilling an FBI informant (OCCRP, 2022). 


Hearts and Minds

From Mexico to Patagonia, Russia proliferates propaganda tailored to the region. RT en Español and Sputnik Mundo work alongside a network of influencers and bots. While RT and Sputnik cover relevant news, their framing is consistently anti-US and pro-Russia. They play into the region's grievances with the US and focus on themes of decolonization, building a multipolar world, and anti-interventionism (Farah & Ortiz, 2023). They flipped the script on Ukraine, portraying Russia as a benign regional power fighting against an oppressive American hegemon and their puppet Zelenskyy. Thanks to the US’s history in LAC, this message found fertile ground.


According to a Pew survey (2025), over 60% of people polled in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, had little to no confidence in Zelenskyy. In Mexico, a majority of people had a more favorable opinion of Russia than the US.

While most LAC countries condemned Russia’s invasion, they also refused to impose sanctions or provide aid to Ukraine. When the US offered to replace old Soviet arms donated to Ukraine with new models. Colombian President Petro said, no Colombian equipment, regardless of its condition, would ever go to Ukraine (Tass, 2023). Brazil’s Lula, held a similar position, while adding that Ukraine was just as responsible for the war as Russia (EuroNews, 2023). Mexico’s then-President Obrador, criticized US aid to Ukraine, calling it “irrational” and accusing the US of neglecting LAC (Reuters, 2023). 


Along with smearing Ukraine and the US, Russia has used its media platforms to influence politics. The most cited examples are Mexico and Colombia’s 2018 presidential elections, in both cases, the media channels promoted the anti-US candidate (Farah & Ortiz, 2023). There is also evidence of an attempted Russian hack on Mexico’s international electronic voting system (Donda, 2018). While it is unlikely that Russia affected the outcome of these elections, that is not the point. Russia is not in the business of winning elections, Russia cares about undermining democracy and fueling tensions. To that end, RT and Sputnik have been very effective, albeit aided by local corruption and US media.


A False Equivalence

‘What would the US do if Russia made a military alliance with Mexico?’ The question implies that Ukraine was about to enter an alliance with NATO and Russia invaded to stop it. However, when Russia annexed Crimea and sent ‘little green men’ to the Donbas, Ukraine was constitutionally neutral, less than 20% of the Ukrainian population wanted to join NATO (SITE, 2023), and NATO members were opposed to Ukraine joining. All of which were non-starters for Ukrainian NATO membership.  


That said, many people, including Meirshimer, would point out, while Ukraine was neutral in 2014, the President who made Ukraine neutral, Yanukovych, was ousted by a US-led coup and replaced by a pro-Western government. This forced Russia to secure its interests by annexing Crimea and gives credence to the argument that Ukraine was being co-opted by the US and posed a direct threat to Russia.


Evidence for the claim of a US-orchestrated coup largely rests on the infamous Nuland phone call and US funding for NGOs. While the US did give Ukraine five billion dollars, as the claim goes. That five billion was the total amount given since 1991. It went to various programs including securing Chernobyl, health initiatives, and ironically, military and police training (State.org, 2013). 


In the Nuland phone call, US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland can be heard discussing which figure of the opposition coalition should be the next prime minister. Her preference was Yetsanuyk, and Yetsanuyk became the prime minister. However, Nuland was not alone in her preferences. During the protests, the then besieged president Yanukovych offered Yetsanyuk the prime ministership. Yetsenyuk turned it down tweeting, “No deal @ua_yanukovych, we're finishing what we started. The people decide our leaders, not you. #Євромайдан.” 



Later, after Yanukovych fled Kyiv, Yetsenyuk was voted into the position by an overwhelming majority of the Rada (Ukrainian Parliament). Four months after Yestsenyuk’s appointment, Ukraine held internationally observed presidential elections which were won by Petro Poroshenko (OSCE, 2014)  who, five years later ran against Zelenskyy and lost. By definition, coups are not led by mass coalitions acting outside of government or military, nor do they typically hold fair elections immediately after seizing power. 


Then, there is the popular support. According to a survey done by the Research & Branding Group in December 2013, 49% of the Ukrainian population supported the protests, with 45% opposed. Estimates of several million to ten million people participated in the protests in direct and indirect ways (Kotsiuk, 2025). When polled as to their motivation, 69.6% of protesters reported that they joined the movement in response to the authorities' “fierce repressions” against protesters. 53.5% of protesters cited Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement, 49.9% said they wanted to change life in the country (DIF and KIIS, 2014). Yanukovych did far more to inspire the protests than a speech from John McCain or cookies from Nuland ever could. To blame the US for Yanukovych’s ousting is to ignore or dismiss a plurality of Ukrainians.


To the point that Russia needed to invade in 2014 to secure its interests. The new Ukrainian government gave Russia an opening to manage its security concerns. In March of 2014, Yetsanyuk publicly declared Ukraine would not seek NATO membership (Reuters, 2014). It was only several months after Russia annexed Crimea and fueled conflict in the Donbas, that the government changed course and pursued NATO. By then, Ukraine's territorial dispute over Crimea and the conflict in the East created more barriers to membership. These barriers held all the way through to Russia’s full scale invasion in 2022.


Given that Ukraine’s membership into NATO was far from imminent, the comparison to Russia forming a military alliance with Mexico is misleading. However, the US was actively involved in Russia’s near abroad and the spirit of the question is worth engaging with. What would the US do if Russia were building alliances in its near abroad?


Between Diplomacy and Force: The US Response

Considering Russia’s activities in LAC, not to mention China’s, the answer is, for the moment, not much (Kurylo, 2023). Despite the Monroe Doctrine, the strongest response the US has had to Russian activities in LAC is sanctions. 


This passivity has not always been the case. In 1961, the US tried a lite-invasion of Cuba in the infamous Bay of Pigs debacle, escalating the tension between the two countries. A year later Castro put Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. This time, Kennedy took a more measured response. The Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved with diplomacy, not hot conflict, and ended with an agreement: the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba and the US removed NATO missiles from Türkiye and promised not to invade Cuba. Every situation is unique, but it is fair to say that invasions and annexations are not the default response to insecurity. More relevantly, they are not a solution to insecurity.


Photo by Igor Omilaev on Unsplash


Play Stupid Games, Win Stupid Prizes

When great powers trample their neighbors, they create the security threats they claim to be trying to avoid. In this, Russia is the rule. Memories of the violent suppression of protests in Hungary and Czechoslovakia fueled Eastern Bloc states’ desire to leave the Warsaw Pact and join NATO (Miles, 2024). After over a century of living in Russia's sphere, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia believed their best hope for security and prosperity was joining NATO and the EU (ZÁJEDOVÁ, 1999). Russia’s war with Georgia further inspired neighboring states to seek protection from NATO. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and infiltration of the Donbas made Ukraine lose faith in neutrality and fueled a need to join NATO. Finally, it was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that pushed Finland and Sweden to drop their neutrality and join NATO. 


Similarly, the US’s history of propping up dictators, supporting coups, and exploiting resources throughout LAC has inspired resentment and mistrust, opening the door to Russia and China. The US policies also contributed to the regional poverty and criminality that now affect the US in the form of illegal immigration and drugs. Though some lessons have been learned, not all have sunk in. Currently, the US is acting out a sad parody of Russia with its trade wars and threats to annex Canada, Greenland, and the Panama Canal. In a predictable response, US allies are looking to reduce their dependence on the US, effectively reducing US influence and increasing its vulnerability.


This power dynamic has been played out again and again. India’s blockade gave Nepal a reason to turn to China. China’s activities in the South China Sea have encouraged the Philippines and Vietnam to build closer alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the US.


Major powers lose their sphere of influence, not due to encroaching adversaries, but to their denial of their neighbor’s autonomy. They overplay their hand, abuse their power, and fail to provide their neighbors with anything worth staying for. 

Conclusion

Of course, the US wants a say in Russian activities in LAC, just as Russia wants a say in NATO activities in its “near abroad.” It is realistic for powerful states to protect their national security and their concerns should be respected. Likewise, major powers should respect the concerns of those they wish to influence. It is unrealistic to expect small states to accept violations of their sovereignty or limits to their economic potential. Major powers may be able to force their neighbors to capitulate for a time. However, small states have a will of their own, reducing them to a means of security or power projection all but guarantees future conflict. If long-term security is the goal, empowering a rules-based system that protects sovereignty, facilitates negotiations, and upholds treaties would be more rational than violently clinging to a sphere of influence.


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