The Geopolitics of Depopulation: Development, Demography, and Migration in Poland, Romania, and Hungary

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe has undergone a radical transformation. The 1990s brought difficult economic reforms, political instability, and mass emigration. Although more than three decades have passed since those events, the countries of the region have undergone profound restructuring on many levels. Many states—from Poland, through Hungary, to Romania—have transformed from political and economic peripheries into key players in the European Union, NATO members, investment-attracting economies, and net immigration destinations.

Today, however, despite clear integration and economic successes, the region faces a new structural challenge: long-term depopulation. Aging societies, population outflows from the province to large urban centers, and labor shortages are destabilizing the foundations of growth.

At the same time, Central and Eastern Europe is becoming a space of intensified strategic rivalry, not only within the EU but also between global powers, who perceive the region as a strategic asset in the geopolitical puzzle. It is seen not only as a buffer zone but also as a potential leverage point on the European continent. Despite spectacular economic growth, Central and Eastern Europe is increasingly slipping into a quiet yet systemic demographic collapse. This is perfectly illustrated by the examples of the region’s most significant players: Poland, Romania, and Hungary. These examples are also interesting due to the diverse contexts and development directions these countries have taken and their varied structural backgrounds.

According to World Bank data, in 1991, Poland had over 38 million inhabitants, Romania – 23 million, and Hungary – over 10 million. In 2023, these numbers look much more modest: Poland’s population has dropped to 36.7 million, Romania’s – to just under 19 million, and Hungary’s – to just over 9.5 million.

World Bank Data: Populations of Poland, Romania, and Hungary in 1991-2023

At the same time, the GDP of these countries has increased several times over: Poland from $85 billion to over $800 billion, Romania from $29 billion to $350 billion, and Hungary from $35 billion to over $210 billion. Life expectancy has increased – but natural population growth has not. In 2023, Poland recorded -0.4%, Hungary -0.5%, and Romania was approaching zero (World Bank).

This is no longer just a story of young people leaving and aging societies with significant internal migrations reshaping the spatial structure of the countries. It is the story of a region that has leveraged the EU integration context to ascend economically and develop accordingly, but is demographically on the brink of erosion – and for that very reason, it is becoming strategically interesting. Because where there is a vacuum, capital, influence, infrastructure—and often geopolitics—flow in.

Case 1: Poland

In this context, power plays and interests become the key. Not only the European Union and its giants—Germany and France—hold assets in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but also the United States, Russia, and China.

An example of strong European integration combined with deep anchoring in the idea of transatlanticism is Poland, which leverages its orientation toward the so-called “The West” against Russia—seen as an existential threat—positioning itself as a close ally of the US and Germany (which has been a strategic US ally since the end of World War II and the onset of the Iron Curtain).

As the largest country on NATO’s eastern flank, Poland is carrying out infrastructure investments using American influence. Such investments include the expansion of military infrastructure under the European Deterrence Initiative, the development of LNG terminals – such as the one in Świnoujście (Zarzecki, 2021), whose importance has grown since Poland cut itself off from Russian gas, the construction of the Central Communication Port (Hübner et al. 2018), envisioned as both a civilian logistics hub and a potential strategic asset, and the modernization of rail and road infrastructure in the spirit of the Three Seas Initiative, to which the United States has added a strategic component and which was particularly supported by Donald Trump during his first term (The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2017).

At the same time, Poland is a representation of the EU’s most dynamic military modernization, allocating tens of billions of dollars to arms purchases from American corporations, further deepening its national security dependence on the transatlantic axis. One example of such dependency is the missile defense shield in Redzikowo (Newsweek, 2024).

This orientation, although providing a short-term strengthening of the regional position, also means greater exposure to internal tensions within Western cooperation, including political reorientations.

On the other hand, Poland’s strategic anchoring in Europe’s economic and energy structure is exemplified by German investments which—although less spectacular than American ones—are deeply systemic. German automotive companies such as Mercedes Benz and Volkswagen, have invested significant financial resources in Poland, building vehicle factories, R&D centers, and component assembly lines (Domański & Gwosdz, 2009). Simultaneously, German companies like Siemens Gamesa are participating in the transformation of the Polish energy sector, focusing mostly on complex issues related to know-how, production, and delivery of key machinery parts (GreenNews.pl, 2019). Additionally, German logistical and engineering capital is actively shaping Poland’s transport and logistics infrastructure, making it not only Germany’s manufacturing base but also a key point on the map of trans-European trade corridors (Rokicki et al. 2020). All of this contributes to a strategic project of silent but consistent integration of Poland with the German development model, which views Poland as a key junior partner and part of a broader Mitteleuropean "assembly zone" for German industrial products.

Photo by Artem Lobastov on Unsplash

While anchored in the West, Poland cautiously hedges with Beijing’s shadow play and alongside Euro-Atlantic structures is also trying to maintain favorable political and economic relations with the People’s Republic of China, which is marking its increasingly visible—though still very cautious—presence in the region, characterized by a very slow and patient investment approach using soft power, long-term strategies, and infrastructural pragmatism. Although skeptical of the Chinese political model and closely tied to the US, Poland remains an important part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – mainly as a transshipment point in the Eurasian corridor.

The rail terminal in Małaszewicze, key for transport between China and the EU, for years symbolized the Sino-Polish economic and logistical partnership. While geopolitical considerations obstructed CATL's battery megafactory investment in Poland (Money.pl, 2022), the broader trajectory reveals growing economic interdependence – evidenced by the consistent 10% annual expansion of China-Poland trade volumes, which surpassed $42 billion in 2023 (China Briefing, 2024).

This paradox illustrates the complex dynamics shaping infrastructure investments by Chinese giants in Central Europe. Unlike the US and Germany, China builds its influence in the shadows of grand rhetoric, through actions: logistics, digital infrastructure, and trade diplomacy.

It does not invest with flair but systematically tests boundaries—both economic and political—hoping that in the event of geopolitical overload in the West, it will be able to transform its presence into something far more permanent.

Case 2: Romania

Once dismissed as an EU periphery, Romania now emerges as a pivotal Black Sea actor. Caught between Western integration and regional threats, Romania is gradually changing its geopolitical stance, balancing between Western influence and its own regional ambitions. Like Poland, Romania feels pressure from Russia, whose military activity in the Black Sea and the region – in the form of the attack on Ukraine or support for separatists in Transnistria, is seen as a real threat. In response, Bucharest is developing close relations with the US, which is primarily present through military bases such as Deveselu – a key component of the US missile defense shield in Europe and investments in the modernization of the Romanian armed forces (US Embassy in Romania, 2016). The US military presence and technological support strengthen Romania’s position as a strategic NATO ally on the southeastern flank.

At the same time, Germany remains Romania’s most important economic partner in the EU. In the Romanian automotive and industrial sectors, German FDIs dominate, investing in factories and R&D centers (Egresi, 2007).

France, though less visible than Germany or the United States, is steadily building its influence in Romania, primarily through investments in the defense sector (military equipment supplies and technology transfers), but also via diplomatic and cultural initiatives aimed at strengthening bilateral cooperation. This strategy resonates well in Romania, where the French are held in high esteem and viewed as culturally close. Projects led by French stakeholders in the energy and transportation sectors are playing a significant role in modernizing Romania’s infrastructure, a key component of the country’s growing international relevance as a major Black Sea actor and a strategic transit hub (Grad-Rusu, 2024). Bucharest is leveraging this multi-vectoral strategy to reinforce its sovereignty and increase its maneuverability between major powers – particularly given its geographic proximity to assertive players like Russia and Türkiye, while the latter expanding Black Sea footprint—from drone sales to energy deals—adds another layer of complexity for Bucharest.

Case 3: Hungary

Hungary, meanwhile, stands out as a political outlier in the region – deliberately navigating between Eastern and Western spheres of influence in an attempt to extract maximum benefit from both sides. While Hungary’s economic ties with Germany are deeply rooted, political tensions persist due to the growing authoritarianism in Budapest and value-based disagreements. Nevertheless, German corporations remain key investors in the Hungarian economy, and Germany is the country’s largest trading partner, providing technology and capital that help maintain Hungary’s relative economic stability (Tam & Ocs, 2021). This economic symbiosis, however, does not always translate into political alignment, giving the relationship a character of strategic tension.

Russia serves as an alternative strategic partner for Hungary, particularly in the energy sector.

The Paks nuclear power plant project, backed financially and technologically by Moscow, exemplifies a form of strategic cooperation that allows Hungary to partially shield itself from the EU and the U.S. pressure.

Hungary also relies heavily on Russian gas imports and pricing, which aligns with the strengthening oligarchic system in the country—where the ruling party’s—Fidesz-aligned political elites maintain close ties with Russia’s financial elite (NS Energy, 2020; Kamola-Cieślik, 2024). Budapest often stands alone within the EU in advocating for continued dialogue and cooperation with Moscow, walking a fine line between confrontation and pragmatism.

Photo by Yves Alarie on Unsplash

When it comes to China, Hungary emerges as the most active and bold partner in the region. Budapest strongly supports the Belt and Road Initiative, seeing it as a pathway to accelerated infrastructure development and fresh capital inflows. Chinese investments in Hungary’s transport sector (e.g., the Budapest–Belgrade railway) and digital technology—notably the growing role of Huawei—reflect a pragmatic approach to partner diversification (Investigate Europe, 2021).

The two countries also maintain a robust intellectual partnership, symbolized by the planned establishment of a Fudan University campus in Budapest – the first such Chinese university campus in the EU (EuroNews, 2021). Touted by Orbán’s government as an investment in the future and in academic exchange, the project has stirred significant controversy both in Budapest and in Brussels. Critics highlight the lack of transparency in its financing, especially the heavy involvement of Chinese capital. Hungary’s opposition voiced strong objections, and mass protests in Budapest revealed deep societal and political unease over Beijing’s growing influence in an EU and NATO member state. This Hungarian-Chinese cooperation, often pursued independently of EU policy frameworks, underscores Hungary’s unique role presumably as a ‘bridge’ between China and Central and Eastern Europe, or perhaps a Trojan horse for Beijing’s divide et impera tactics.

However, in order to pursue their political ambitions, whether clearly pro-Western as in Poland or pivotally strategic as in Hungary – countries need energy. Not only cheap electric energy powering their industrial capabilities but also human energy: so-called “human resources” and the capital associated with them. Simply speaking: a strong demographic base, both in the present and in the years and decades to come. Yet the natural population growth trends in all three of the discussed countries are negative, with all of them currently experiencing a decline in the birth-to-death ratio and having a very low Total Fertility Ratio. As a complementary mechanism, immigration comes into play.

In this regard, migration policy and the ability to operationalize its strategic assumptions are key. Given the high demand for labor across the region, multiple factors – and their corresponding policy responses –become critical:

1. Immigration scale – balancing demographic needs with social acceptance thresholds.

2. Migration flow distribution – managing arrivals to prevent service sector bottlenecks.

3. Border control capabilities – infrastructure vs. humanitarian imperatives.

4. Skills evaluation frameworks – aligning migrant qualifications with labor market gaps; simplification of nostrification processes for some professions.

5. Migrant origin patterns – cultural proximity and integration potential factors.

6. Spatial absorption capacities – housing availability and regional development disparities.

7. Operational integrative policies – linguistic-cultural centers, credential recognition, anti-discrimination measures.

Regarding the last two aspects, we observe a significant migratory influx from Eastern European countries (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine), as well as a growing component from selected Asian countries (China, India, Türkiye, Vietnam) (OECD, 2024). This constitutes a fundamental difference compared to immigrant diasporas in Western European countries and could become one of the defining factors in shaping the specificity of immigration to Central and Eastern Europe, as well as a basis for further exploration of potential immigration-attracting strategies, e.g., targeting countries in Central Asia.

A key issue tied to spatial integration is the growing challenge of simultaneous urbanization and depopulation.

Even if countries successfully address most of the previously mentioned challenges, without a proper geographical redistribution of the population—and thus without incentives and integration strategies targeting areas outside of large urban centers—they will face new, structural issues, and these will meet the demand to be tackled through additional public and interventionist policies. On the other hand – Bucharest, Budapest, and Warsaw could mirror East-Asian megalopolises like Tokyo or Seoul –a hyper-dense capital encircled by a landscape of emptying towns and villages.

Photo by Antoine Schibler on Unsplash

The eastern part of the European Union was not and is not perceived as a full-fledged part of the "Western world" but rather as a semi-periphery – a playing field for global powers eager to exploit its structural weaknesses. Demographic decline, economic dependency, and limited political agency make the region vulnerable to external pressure. This raises a critical question: will the region choose a more autonomous and assertive approach-deepening intra-regional cooperation and becoming an active co-shaper of EU processes that serve its regional interests, or will it allow itself to be played by external actors such as the US, China, or Russia?

The future and its perspectives are far from clear. In place of the classical, demography-based model of statehood, a new paradigm is emerging – one in which migration becomes a tool for managing both population and development. In times of both ongoing deglobalization and permanent shifts in capital and labor mobility, Central and Eastern European countries risk becoming lasting managed peripheries: operating in the shadow of decisions made elsewhere, dependent on foreign investors, geopolitical configurations, and uncontrolled flows of people.

Avoiding this scenario requires a conscious policy – one that not only responds to immediate challenges but also shapes a long-term-development vision. Without it, the "Eastern EU" will remain an empty space, not only demographically, but also politically and strategically – an ideational vacuum ready to be filled by external forces.

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