The Chinese Factor: China's Play in the South Caucasus

Georgia’s relationship with China appears to be deepening rapidly. Over the last four years, the two countries have signed a strategic partnership, expanded infrastructure cooperation, and portrayed one another as close political partners. Yet the relationship is notably asymmetric. While Georgia has endorsed Beijing’s foreign policy positions and welcomed Chinese participation in and ownership of major infrastructure projects, it has received wavering investment and limited diplomatic support in return. This imbalance is not a flaw; it is a feature. Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, constructs foreign policy around securing power rather than long-term good governance. Similarly, China’s relations with Georgia are not about Georgia, but about securing trade routes and fostering alternatives to democratic governance around the world. 

Sino-Georgian Relations

Georgia and China have had relations since 1992. In 2016, Georgia signed onto China’s Belt and Road Initiative. A year later, the two countries agreed on a free-trade deal (Chinese Embassy, 2023). Then in 2023, China and Georgia signed the framework for a “Strategic Partnership” (Civil Georgia, 2023a). 

This partnership included four domains in which Georgia and China agreed to work together: political, economic, cultural, and international.

The partnership requires that “Georgia firmly adheres to the One-China Principle”. Georgia also agreed to China’s Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilisation Initiative (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Georgia, 2023). 

The two areas in which China and Georgia’s partnership has produced material outcomes are tourism and infrastructure. Thanks to their visa-free policy, Chinese tourism to Georgia has increased by 83% in 2025 (Topuria, 2026). 

That said, Chinese tourists only account for a fraction of Georgia’s overall tourism. Georgia’s infrastructure, on the other hand, has China written all over it, literally. Across Georgia, Chinese companies are building railways, bridges, and tunnels. In 2024, Georgia awarded a Chinese consortium the rights to build and control 49% of the Anaklia Black Sea Port (Castillo, 2024). The Anaklia Port is one of Georgia’s most pivotal projects, as it has the potential to significantly increase Georgia’s viability as a hub of East-West trade. 

Chinese factory in Georgia. Photo by J. S. Feral.

Imbalance

Despite Georgia and China’s growing relationship, as of July 6, 2026, China pulled out of the Anaklia Black Sea port project (Anaklia Monitor, 2026). The Georgian government announced that it will manage the development of the port under a “landlord model” and that it welcomes investment from China, Central Asian countries, and Azerbaijan (Civil Georgia, 2026f). Georgian Dream has stated that the contract was dropped for “national interests” and that they have interested investors, though they have not named any to date (Anaklia Monitor, 2026). The prospect of a state-built port raises concerns of public debt, accountability, and lack of expertise. It has also perpetuated doubts that the port will ever be finished (Anaklia Monitor, 2026). 

Despite Georgia’s agreement  to China’s many initiatives as well as upholding China’s territorial claims, Georgia has received little tangible benefits  in return.  China is not in the top ten of Georgia’s foreign investors (Topuria, 2026). China does buy many Georgian exports and comes in behind Türkiye and the US in supplying Georgia’s imports (Civil Georgia, 2025d). China has abstained from voting on Georgia’s UN resolutions to support the return of people who fled Georgia’s contested territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, twice (Topuria, 2026). Even more brazen, in 2025, Beijing hosted a delegation from Abkhazia for an EXPO. The Abkhazia delegation signed a memorandum of cooperation with the Guangdong Chamber of Commerce (Sekhniashvili, 2025). With this action, China toed the line of giving Abkhazia international recognition.

Regardless of China’s behaviour towards Georgia’s territorial sovereignty, on June 9, 2026, Georgia and China announced a new ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (Topuria, 2026). Unlike the first Strategic Partnership, this announcement came with minimal fanfare. The description of the partnership limited itself to platitudes about “mutual respect,” “mutual trust,” and “long-standing friendship” (Civil Georgia, 2026e).

These vagaries and lack of concrete commitments give the impression that the new partnership is little more than a PR campaign. A way for the Georgian government to demonstrate, domestically and abroad, that it does not need the West because it has China.  

Why China? 

The shallowness of the new ''Comprehensive Strategic Partnership'' highlights the real utility of the Sino-Georgian relationship. It is not about what China can do for Georgia, but what China can do for Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD).  

The Georgian Dream does not get along with Western liberal countries. A few of GD’s notable policies include anti-LGBTQ+ regulations and the “Russian Law”, which requires organisations that receive foreign funding to register as foreign agents (Transparency International Georgia, 2025). After GD won parliament in the contested 2024 election, they allegedly used the WWI chemical weapon, bromobenzyl cyanide (camite), on protesters (Hudson, Marocico, Buckley, 2025). They banned face coverings at protests and restricted the right to assemble. They passed laws that can be used to limit NGOs, political parties, media, and generally trample on liberal norms (Transparency International Georgia, 2025).

In response, European countries and the US have sanctioned over 230 GD members (Transparency International Georgia, 2026). Making it clear that Georgian Dream cannot run Georgia the way it wants while partnering with Western powers. In contrast, China has no problem with GD’s questionable election, human rights abuses, or their oppressive laws. Instead of condemning GD, Beijing moved to capitalize on GD’s protester problem.

According to the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Tbilisi municipality bought 251 cameras from Dahua Technology, a Chinese firm that has been accused of involvement in China’s state surveillance programs and the repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Dowsett, 2025).  The Dahua cameras are thought to be enabled with AI-powered facial recognition technology. The surveillance research company IPVM has reported that Dahua’s AI is programmed to identify potential protests by detecting the presence of posters, banners, and face masks (Deng, 2023).

Following the installation of the new cameras, authorities relied on administrative fines rather than physical force. They quietly sent protesters fines of up to 1,900 USD  for “blocking the road” (Civil Georgia, 2025b). 

Chinese truck in Georgia. Photo by J. S. Feral.

Ideology

Not only does China enable GD’s policies, but it also promotes core tenets of GD’s ideology, which can be summed up as anti-liberal and anti-West. Through a social media campaign aimed at Georgia, the CCP pushed the message that China is a stronger, more advanced, and more capable partner than the US (DFRlab, 2025). China’s messaging depicts the failures of Western democracies and the benefits of authoritarian-style rule (Partager, 2026). Elections, freedom, checks & balances are chaotic and corruptible, whereas authoritarianism is stable and efficient (Chester, 2025).

Not all of the pro-China messaging in Georgia comes from China. Georgian Dream puts out more than its share, often depicting China as a faithful international representative, a fair mediator with Russia, and a defender of Georgia’s territorial integrity.

Their main message is that China, not the EU or the US, is the key to Georgia’s future (DFRLab,2025).

This message is spread across local news, social media, and public statements, such as those made by Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze:

“China, of course, plays a very special role. It should be noted that China is currently the only peaceful superpower in global politics. That is why we share common values. This is precisely why deepening cooperation with China is particularly valuable to us,” (Imedi, 2025).

“The desire to open a second front in Georgia is so strong that the Global War Party has pushed the entire European bureaucracy into attack mode against Georgia,” (Civil Georgia, 2026c).

With the portrayal of China as a strong partner along with effective anti-West anti-democracy messaging, Georgian Dream can reframe the loss of Western alignment and the departure from liberal norms. Georgia is not isolated or slipping back into dependency on Russia; it has a new alliance with a pragmatic superpower. Georgia is not democratically backsliding, it is avoiding the chaos, corruption, and war that are consuming Western democracies. 

Alternative Endings

Georgian Dream is using its relationship with China to paper over the reality that Georgia is drifting further into isolation. While isolation may benefit Georgian Dream’s leadership in the short term, it will have negative consequences for Georgia. However, even if GD does not realign with the West, it still has better options than imbalanced hollow alliances. For a start, Georgia could hedge against China and Russia by pursuing closer relations with Türkiye, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian countries. It would be particularly useful for Georgia to be part of Armenia and Azerbaijan’s rapprochement, enabling the South Caucasus to expand their trade routes and negotiate as a bloc. Diversifying dependencies and pursuing multilateral agreements could give Georgia the leverage it needs to reap real benefits from its relations with major powers, be they China, Russia, the US, or the EU. 

References

1. Alimova, S. (2026, June 9). Georgian PM hails highly significant China deal: We are entering new era of comprehensive strategic partnership. TV1 Georgia. https://1tv.ge/lang/en/news/georgian-pm-hails-highly-significant-china-deal-we-are-entering-new-era-of-comprehensive-strategic-partnership/

2. Anaklia Monitor. (2026, July). Anaklia changes course again: The port is taken off the market before construction begins. Civil Idea. https://civicidea.ge/en/anaklia-changes-course-again-the-port-is-taken-off-the-market-before-construction-begins/

3. Castillo, N. (2024, July 22). Georgia’s Black Sea coast: The changing tide of Russian and Chinese presence. Caspian Policy Centre. https://caspianpolicy.org/research/georgia/georgias-black-sea-coast-the-changing-tide-of-russian-and-chinese-presence  

4. Chester, P. (2025, April 16). Framing democracy: Deciphering China’s anti-democratic propaganda using word embeddings (21st Century China Centre Research Paper No. 2025-03). University of California, San Diego.

5. Civil Georgia. (2023a, July 31) Georgia and China Issue Joint Statement on Strategic Partnership. https://civil.ge/archives/553820 

6. Civil Georgia. (2025b, March 19). GYLA: Fines Imposed on Protesters - Severe Violation of Freedom of Assembly. https://civil.ge/archives/670184 

7. Civil Georgia. (2025c, July 18). Kobakhidze Says ‘Global War Party’ Uses EU Visa Threat to Open Second Front in Georgia. https://civil.ge/archives/693168 

8. Civil Georgia. (2026d, January 20). Georgia’s Foreign Trade Up 10% in 2025. https://civil.ge/archives/717932 

9. Civil Georgia. (2026e, June 9). Georgia and China Elevate Relations to ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.’  https://civil.ge/archives/737787 

10. Civil Georgia. (2026f, July 6). Anaklia Port to Be Developed by Georgian State Under ‘Landlord Model,’ Kvrivishvili Says. https://civil.ge/archives/743550 

11. Deng, B. (2023, June 5). In China, AI cameras alert police when a banner is unfurled. Radio Free Asia. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/surveillance-06052023142155.html

12. DFRLab. (2024, December 10). Cross-platform campaign in Georgia emphasizes China as an alternative to the United States. https://dfrlab.org/2024/12/10/cross-platform-campaign-in-georgia-emphasizes-china-as-an-alternative-to-the-united-states/  

13. Dowsett, J. (2025, March 28). Georgia’s surveillance surge: Chinese cameras spark protest crackdown fears. OCCRP. https://www.occrp.org/en/news/georgias-surveillance-surge-chinese-cameras-spark-protest-crackdown-fears

14. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Georgia. (2023, August 7). https://ge.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202308/t20230807_11123383.htm

15. Hudson, Marocico, and Buckley. (2025, December 1). WW1 toxic compound sprayed on Georgian protesters, BBC evidence suggests. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czrk7g50e1po

16. Imedi. (2025, November 7). Georgia sees China as Key partner in strengthening economy, connectivity, political standing, says Georgian PM. https://info.imedi.ge/en/politics/7532/georgia-sees-china-as-key-partner-in-strengthening-economy-connectivity-political-standing-says-georgian-pm

17. Partager. (2026, March 16). China’s creeping influence in Georgia’s information space. Reporters Without Borders.  https://rsf.org/en/china-s-creeping-influence-georgia-s-information-space  

18. Sekhniashvili, I. (2025, December 1). China’s double-edged sword in Georgia: Has Tbilisi entered an unequal game? China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe. https://chinaobservers.eu/chinas-double-edged-sword-in-georgia-has-tbilisi-entered-an-unequal-game/

19. Topuria, R. (2026, June 13). Georgia’s upgraded partnership with China: A louder signal, an empty promise. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2026/06/georgias-upgraded-partnership-with-china-a-louder-signal-an-empty-promise/  

20. Transparency International Georgia. (2025, April 4). Path to dictatorship: Review of Georgian Dream’s recent repressive legislative initiatives. https://transparency.ge/en/post/path-dictatorship-review-georgian-dreams-recent-repressive-legislative-initiatives

21. Transparency International Georgia. (2026, March 24). Sanctioned Georgian Dream representatives and propaganda TV channels. https://transparency.ge/en/post/sanctioned-georgian-dream-representatives-and-propaganda-tv-channels

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