Trapped in the Ashes: Lebanon’s Endless Return to Identity Politics

On April 13th, 2025, Lebanon marked the 50th commemoration of the outbreak of its civil war, which lasted 15 years and ended the lives of 120,000 people (6). Although the war began with a fight between a Christian militia and Palestinian factions, that was not the sole reason. To this day, the reasons that triggered the war are still disputed among scholars and the Lebanese people. Nonetheless, there is a broad agreement that one factor played a central role in shaping the conflict: sectarian tensions.

It is speculated that several interrelated issues might have contributed to the escalation of the Lebanese Civil War. Among them was the marginalization of the Shia community, which faced social, economic, and political exclusion. The unequal distribution of power also played a role, which can be illustrated by the excessive powers granted to the Maronite president. Additionally, unfolding regional dynamics such as the Arab-Israeli wars and the resulting influx of Palestinian refugees into Lebanon worsened internal tensions. These factors also intersected with the increasing grievances of the working class. Even after the official end of the war, the sectarian system that fueled the conflict remains intact.

Indeed, with 18 officially recognized sects(3), including major groups such as Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, and Druze, Lebanon has a complex sectarian landscape.

Political conventions such as the 1943 National Pact and the 1989 Taif Agreement have entrenched a power-sharing system in which political authority is divided among sects. For instance, as established by the National Pact (2), the President is traditionally a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim. Because each sect has its own political and religious perspective on national issues, Lebanon’s capacity to develop a unified national policy has been impeded by its sectarian political structure. Additionally, sects are mostly focused on protecting their own interests, which means that the perpetuation of these sectarian divisions has made it impossible to reach political agreement or significant reform. For example, political parties such as Hezbollah and the Amal Movement are claimed to be representatives of the Shia sect, while others, such as the Free Patriotic Movement and the Future Movement, act as mouthpieces for the Christian and Sunni communities, respectively (1).

Photo by Syed Aoun Abbas on Unsplash

Hence, this commemoration serves to remind us how destructive sectarian divisions are. And yet, half a century later, the elephant in the room remains: the political sectarianism entrenched in every aspect of Lebanese life. As long as we continue to organize, vote, grieve, and resist based on our sects, we will reinforce the very structures of power that exploit us through our sectarian divides.

Recent developments only prove this. After the devastating 66-day war with Israel in late 2024, as well as the recent escalations in several parts of Lebanon, the Lebanese people are still at odds regarding the situation with Israel and the consequent necessary solutions. Instead of rallying around a unified national response, different communities interpreted the events based on their sectarian and political affiliations, particularly in terms of Hezbollah’s role in the conflict.

Additionally, according to The Arab Weekly (7), in a symbolic move, billboards reading “عهد جديد للبنان” (“A New Era for Lebanon”) replaced partisan propaganda on the road from the airport, which was previously dominated by Hezbollah banners. Within a few hours, many of these posters were torched and burned down.

This is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, the myth of a “new era” persists in Lebanon’s political vocabulary. It is recycled every few years by the same elites who have no intention of changing the system that keeps them in power and keeps the people’s sense of identity divided. This language of rebirth has come to feel like denial. It is impossible to inaugurate a new era when the same oppressive political structures are completely intact.

In other words, before we speak of national renewal and an ideal new era, we must confront the fact that the sectarian regime has never left. Of course, it is not just internal. Internationally, Lebanon continues to be viewed through this same sectarian prism. Global powers and international media rarely address Lebanon as a unified actor. Instead, they dissect it based on different factions.

The fact that we identify first according to our sect is not always a conscious choice – we have been socialized into it. It has become a deeply embedded instinct, instrumentalized by the elites.

Even the acts of resistance are often viewed through a sectarian lens. Indeed, recent discussions about potential normalization between Lebanon and Israel have intensified, peaking when U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff said such a development was “a real possibility” (5). This push is purposely denying the internal fragmentation that makes such negotiations nearly impossible for the sake of a bigger conquest – the obliteration of Hezbollah.

Whether or not normalization talks are on the Lebanese political agenda, the initial problem that remains is the entrenchment of identity politics that frames resistance to normalization as merely a sectarian stance. This framing delegitimizes resistance by associating it exclusively with one group or one sect’s narrative, rather than recognizing it as a broader anti-colonial, anti-apartheid position rooted in solidarity with the Palestinian people.

Photo by AHMAD BADER on Unsplash

This is why the new government’s suggested reforms–such as the disarmament of Hezbollah–constitute a start, if done under the right conditions, but they are definitely not enough on their own. Not only are reforms insufficient to break Lebanon free from the shackles of decades-long political and economic turmoil, but they also involve an incredibly delicate process. If mismanaged, reforms could easily inflame the already fragile sectarian tensions that have long roamed the country. That is why the system must be uprooted entirely.

As Rosa Luxemburg famously argued in Social Reform or Revolution? (4), “people who pronounce themselves in favour of the method of legislative reform in place and in contradistinction to the conquest of political power and social revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the same goal, but a different goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new society, they take a stand for surface modifications of the old society.” True change can only be achieved through the unified mobilization of the Lebanese people.

Finally, I think it is imperative to talk about another myth that should be debunked. After everything Lebanon has endured, it is too often romanticized as a phoenix, rising again and again from its own ashes. But this metaphor, which should supposedly serve as a beacon of hope, is now a trap. It has allowed the normalization of catastrophe and the acceptance of failure as cyclical and inevitable. A rupture is needed. Thus, April 13th should be marked with rage and with a demand: not for another “new era,” but for the first real one. And the people are in charge of that.

Bibliography

1. Chughtai, A. (2017, November 5). Lebanon’s power players. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/5/lebanons-power-players 

2. El-Khazen, F. (1991). The communal pact of national identities: The making and politics of the 1943 National Pact (Papers on Lebanon No. 12). Centre for Lebanese Studies. https://lebanesestudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/8b844d712.-The-Communal-Pact-of-National-Identities-The-Making-and-Politics-of-the-1943-National-Pact-Farid-el-Khazen-1991.pdf 

3. Henley, A. D. M. (2016, December). Religious authority and sectarianism in Lebanon. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/12/religious-authority-and-sectarianism-in-lebanon?lang=en

4. Luxemburg, R. (1898). Chapter VIII conquest of Political Power. Rosa Luxemburg: Reform or Revolution (Chap.8). https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1900/reform-revolution/ch08.htm 

5. Safieddine, H. (2025, April 11). Can the US push Lebanon to normalise with Israel?. Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/can-us-push-lebanon-normalise-israel 

6. United Nations Human Rights Council. (2006). Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-2/1 (A/HRC/3/2). United Nations. https://undocs.org/A/HRC/3/2 

7. The Arab Weekly. (n.d.). New era: Hezbollah wavers between willingness to disarm and formal denial. Retrieved April 15, 2025, from https://thearabweekly.com/new-era-hezbollah-wavers-between-willingness-disarm-and-formal-denial 

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