Proxy War Does Not Mean What You Think It Means

Ukraine is a proxy war for Asian powers” (Hornung, 2024). The Sudanese civil war is a proxy war (ADF, 2025). “Iran is becoming a Ukrainian-Russian proxy war” (Boot, 2026).

Nearly every conflict today has been called a proxy war. The label is so freely used that it provides little to no information and risks promoting misconceptions. This is, in part, because there is no agreed-upon understanding of what a proxy war is. There is, however, a stigma around the term ‘proxy’. It invokes a caricature of a puppet master pulling strings. In the context of conflict, it suggests that one party is being forced to fight and die at the direction of a more powerful party. In reality, there are no puppets, only actors with layered motivations and abilities.

An examination of theory and history shows that proxies act autonomously to pursue their own interests. They utilise their own leverage and abandon sponsors when it suits them. While coercion is a factor, subjugation is not a given nor, are power imbalances static. Flattening the complexities of the proxy-principal (sponsor) relationship is a distortion of reality that carries grave consequences.

The Ambiguity of Proxies

In his 2013 article on the future of warfare, Mumford describes proxy war as “indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome.” Pfaff (2014, p. 310) defines it as a principal using a surrogate to fight in its place. Others have been more concise, arguing that only states can be principals and only non-state actors can be proxies (New America, n.d.). Karl W. Deutsch illustrates the Cold War understanding as: “An international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country; disguised as a conflict over an internal issue of that country…” (1964, p. 102). The Oxford Learner’s Dictionary says a proxy war is “a war started by a major power that does not itself become involved.”

The same applies to the definitions of basic objects, like chairs. It is a struggle to find the balance between being broad enough to include all chairs while narrow enough not to include everything one could sit on.

A problem with the multiple understandings of ‘proxy war’ is when it is applied under the broad definition, but interpreted through a narrow one.

For example, the Ukrainian-Russian war fits Mumford's broad definition of proxy war. However, calling it a proxy war, without clarifying why, smuggles in the narrow definitions. This leaves the interpretation open to mean that the US or NATO intentionally instigated the war or that Ukraine is being forced to fight for the US or the EU, not for its own independence. Further still, the built-in assumption of a proxy’s lack of autonomy, a puppet on a string, leads to misunderstandings by the public and miscalculations by leadership.

One demonstration of this was Trump telling Zelenskyy that Ukraine had “no cards,” followed by the US thinking Ukraine could be forced into an unfavourable agreement (Ravid, 2025). Another is the theory that the Houthis can be defeated by defeating Iran. (Minor, 2024).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hGjYLyhcIyo

Trump telling Zelenskyy that Ukraine had “no cards.''

Principal-Agent Problem

Regardless of how we define proxies or proxy wars, a proxy’s autonomy is a core factor in the Proxy-Principal relationship. This is illustrated by the Principal-Agent Problem. When a principal directs an agent (proxy) to act, there are two factors that need to come into balance with the principal's leverage. The first is agency. The agent enters into the relationship to serve its own self-interest. The relationship works while both parties’ interests are aligned (Eisenhardt, 1989). If the principal requests that the agent act in a way that runs counter to the agent’s interests, the relationship breaks down. If the agent’s interests diverge from mutual goals, the relationship could turn counterproductive.

Russia faced the problem of diverging interests while using separatist movements as proxies in Eastern Ukraine. The separatists had their own internal competitions and objectives that ran counter to the Kremlin’s. Russia attempted to manage them by, allegedly, assassinating ambitious leaders. From 2014 to 2018, several rebel leaders died in attacks, including the “president” of the DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko. The separatists blamed the killings on Ukrainian intelligence, however there is reason to believe the attacks were ordered by the Kremlin as a means of maintaining control (Warsaw Institute, 2017). Eventually, the Russian army took direct command of the separatists’ forces.

The second stumbling point is risk. When the risk for the agent outweighs the benefits of working with the principal or vice versa, the relationship dissolves (Eisenhardt, 1989).

This was seen in Iraq, during the US operation Inherent Resolve. The US coalition was the principal, and the SDF was the proxy. Both parties had the objective of defeating ISIS in Syria. During the operation, Türkiye launched an offensive against Syrian Kurds. The Turkish operation made it too risky for the SDF to continue operating in that theatre, and they left Inherent Resolve, putting the operation on pause for several months (Fox, 2019).

An even more dramatic example is Russia’s mercenary group, Wagner, and its leader, Prigozhin. In a video made in Bakhmut, Ukraine, Prigozhin accused the then-Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu of not providing enough ammunition for his men on the front lines.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7p5T9SqJoPc

Prigozhin then pulled his men out of Ukraine and marched them towards Moscow in open rebellion. They almost made it to Moscow when Prigozhin surrendered to the Kremlin. While Prigozhin cited the lack of ammunition, there was another possible reason for his actions. A few months prior, Putin had agreed to integrate Wagner into the state military, bringing it under centralised control and displacing Prigozhin (Harding, 2023). Either way, this event shows how a proxy-principal relationship can go wrong if the principal does not mitigate the risk to the proxy, be it to their men’s lives or to their career.

Relationships

Within the framework of the principal-agent theory, there are two types of relationships, transactional and exploitative.

The exploitative relationship, while still subject to the principal-agent problem, is defined by the proxy’s dependency on the principal and the principal’s influence over the proxy. In this dynamic, the principal finds and develops the proxy (Fox, 2019).

In the beginning, this gives the principal considerable leverage over the proxy. However, with success, exploitative relationships evolve, and the proxy grows stronger, developing alternative means of support. One example of this shifting balance of power is Hezbollah and Iran.

Hezbollah originated as a domestic militia during the Lebanese civil war. Seeing their potential, Iran provided them with training, funding, and arms, and developed deep institutional connections (Haq, 2024). From there, Hezbollah evolved into a major political and military power within Lebanon and became a regional actor, with its own criminal networks and global influence. Despite its potential for independence, Hezbollah has maintained its ideological alignment with Iran and Iran continues to be its primary source of funding (Haq, 2024).

Now, in 2026, with the fall of Hezbollah’s neighboring ally, Bashar al-Assad, a drop in its local popularity, and the demise of its leadership, Hezbollah has shifted back to a position of greater dependency on Iran (Khatib, 2026).   

A wooden doll, hanging. Photo by Reza Gholipour on Unsplash

The inverse of the exploitative relationship is the transactional relationship. In the transactional dynamic, it is the proxy who leads (Fox, 2019). An independent actor, often a government, that needs assistance, finds a backer who sees an opportunity. Transactional proxies are in a position to set limits and dictate terms. It is for the principal to maintain the relationship and prevent other external actors from offering the proxy a better deal (Fox, 2019). A well-managed transactional relationship could transition to a long-term alliance. An example of this dynamic is Iran's relationship with the Houthis.

Like Hezbollah, the Houthis started as a domestic actor; unlike Hezbollah, they stayed that way. They predominantly prioritise their domestic interests over Iran’s regional ones (Minor, 2024). While they are aligned with Iran in their opposition to Israel and, at times, Saudi Arabia, they are not dependent on Iran, nor are they ideologically aligned. They have their own means of international pressure, via the Bab al-Mandab Strait. They have their own regional networks (Minor, 2024), and they receive support from China and Russia (Suleymanov, 2025). On top of that, they facilitate Iranian oil sales through their extensive smuggling rings (Russealle, 2025). Far from an Iranian puppet, the Houthis are a financial asset.

Conclusion

Establishing that a conflict has a proxy element is useful, but that is where analysis should start, not end. If proxies were puppets on a string, it might be enough to name their masters. Yet even in extreme cases, where the principal exercises lethal leverage, proxies find room to pursue their own interests, switch sides, or even sabotage their sponsors. Just because a proxy has been compliant, does not mean it will remain so. Therefore, the label ‘proxy war,’ should raise the question: what information is not being not conveyed?

References

1. ADF Magazine. (2025, August). Sudan’s proxy war. https://adf-magazine.com/2025/08/sudans-proxy-war/

2. Boot, M. (2026, March). Council on Foreign Relations.  The Iran conflict is becoming a Russia-Ukraine proxy war. https://www.cfr.org/articles/the-iran-conflict-is-becoming-a-russia-ukraine-proxy-war

3. Brijka, F. (2020). Operational control over non-state proxies. Security and Defence Quarterly. https://securityanddefence.pl/Operational-control-over-non-state-proxies,131044,0,2.html#S8

4. Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. The Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57–74.

5. Fox, A. C. (2019, March–April). Time, power, and principal-agent problems: Why the U.S. Army is ill-suited for proxy warfare hotspots. Military Review, 30–41. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Mar-Apr-2019/28-Time-Power/

6. Gailmard, S. (2012, August.). Accountability and principal-agent models. University of California, Berkeley School of Law. https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/csls/Gailmard_-_Accountability_and_Principal-Agent_Models(2).pdf

7. Haq, I. U. (2024, March). Iran and Hezbollah: Proxy power play. Institute for Security and Development Policy. https://www.isdp.eu/iran-and-hezbollah-proxy-power-play/

8. Harding, L. (2023, June 25). Prigozhin’s march on Moscow: Chronology of an attempted coup. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/25/prigozhins-march-on-moscow-chronology-of-an-attempted-coup

9. Hurnung, J. (2024, November). RAND Corporation. Ukraine is now a proxy war for Asian powers. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/11/ukraine-is-now-a-proxy-war-for-asian-powers.html

10. Khitab, L. (2026, April.). Degradation of Iran’s proxy model. Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs. https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/degradation-irans-proxy-model

11. Quitoz, J. J. (2025, November–December). Proxy wars. Army University Press. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/November-December-2025/Proxy-Wars/

12. Minor, A. (2024, September). The danger of calling the Houthis an Iranian proxy. Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-danger-of-calling-the-houthis-an-iranian-proxy/

13. Mumford, A. (2013). Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict. The RUSI Journal, 158(2), 40–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.787733

14. New America. (n.d.). Twenty-first-century proxy warfare: Confronting strategic innovation in a multipolar world. https://www.newamerica.org/insights/twenty-first-century-proxy-warfare-confronting-strategic-innovation-multipolar-world/conclusion/

15. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionaries. (2026). Oxford University Press.

16. Pfaff, C. A. (2024). Proxy war ethics: The norms of partnering in great power competition (1st ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.

17. Ravid, B. (2025, December). U.S. pushes Zelensky for swift yes on peace plan: Ukrainian Officials say. Axios. https://www.axios.com/2025/12/08/zelensky-trump-ukraine-peace-plan-donbas

18. Rousselle, A. (2026, May). Cash Flow: Breaking Down the Houthis’ Multibillion-Dollar Financial Networks. Global Network on Extremism & Technology. https://gnet-research.org/2025/05/14/cash-flow-breaking-down-the-houthis-multibillion-dollar-financial-networks/

19. Warsaw Institute. (2018, September). Terrorist leader Alexander Zakharchenko killed in terrorist attack. https://warsawinstitute.org/terrorist-leader-alexander-zakharchenko-killed-terrorist-attack/

20. Warsaw Institute. (2017, December). Pucz w Donbasie (Special report). https://warsawinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/EN-Raport-specjalny.-Pucz-w-Donbasie-05.12.2017-pdf.pdf

21. Suleymanov, R. (2025, June). Russia’s interest in the Yemen conflict. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/russiaeurasia/politika/2025/06/russia-interest-yemen-conflict

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