Australia as a Middle Power in the Indo-Pacific

In an era of great power competition, growing global instability, and weakening multilateral institutions, the importance of middle powers has never been more apparent. Traditionally seen as mediators or norm champions, today’s middle powers are adjusting their influence, not by striving to dominate, but by strategically leveraging geography, alliances, and diplomacy to help shape the world order (Jordaan, 2003).

Australia’s global influence has typically been defined by its commitment to multilateralism, regional stability, and values-based diplomacy (Gyngell and Wesley, 2007).

Carr’s (2014) analysis identifies Australia as a middle power, demonstrating the key characteristics of position, behaviour, and identity typical of this classification. However, this was not always the case Australia gained diplomatic authority as an independent middle power in the 1990s, highly credited to the Hawke and Keating Labor governments (Ungerer, 2007).

In the post-Cold War climate, where global power was no longer strictly defined by the U.S.–Soviet binary, Australia’s engagement through groups like the APEC and the Cairns Group were the first initiatives as a proactive regional stabiliser (Ungerer, 2007). Recent global shifts and calls for defensive action have revealed Australia’s bolder approach on the world stage, most evident in the Indo-Pacific, the centre of Australia’s identity and interests, particularly trading partners, security threats, and diplomatic relationships (Scott, 2013). Through defence cooperation, climate management and infrastructure development, Australia has increasingly positioned itself as an actor in counterbalancing China’s expanding authoritarian influence (Wang, 2024).

Efforts like the Pacific Step-Up highlight Australia’s ability to act as a neutral and stable partner with nations like Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Samoa, offering development aid and climate support, prioritising the Pacific’s needs (Wulandari & Saragih, 2023). The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has committed a “record $1.4 billion in development assistance to the Pacific in 2019-20, to help our partner nations address their greatest concerns” (Australian Government, 2019, para. 2). In Southeast Asia, Australia’s engagement through ASEAN, the regional organisation promoting dialogue and cooperation, and the Quad, a security partnership with the United States, India, and Japan, is essential for maintaining regional stability (Busynski, 2025).

Photo by Jametlene Reskp on Unsplash

The 2022 Solomon Islands–China security agreement highlights China’s growing influence in the region. The pact, which allows Chinese security personnel to be deployed in the Solomon Islands and potentially grants China access to Pacific maritime routes, was perceived in Australia as a major strategic challenge (McDougall, 2021).

However, promising partnerships are emerging for Australia, including one with Canberra. McDougall (2021) notes that Canberra responded by intensifying diplomatic engagement and renewing security commitments to Pacific partners, underscoring Australia’s dedication to development and neutrality while navigating great power competition to reassure smaller states.

According to Bisley (2025), Australia’s participation in the AUKUS agreement, a trilateral security pact with the United Kingdom and the United States designed to enhance defence and nuclear capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, represents a bolder shift in its diplomacy.

While the proposed benefits of AUKUS include advanced technology, deterrence, and alliance strategies, for example, against China’s military threats, it has faced criticism over the risk of undermining Australia’s regional trust and independence, being too closely aligned with US military interests (Cheng, 2022).

Beyond this debate, Australia also faces misconceptions that it is “distant” and “irrelevant” in geopolitics due to its geographic positioning. As an Australian, I see this view as not only outdated but deeply misleading. Geography places Australia at the meeting point of the Indian and Pacific Oceans - two of the world’s most contested and strategically vital waterways. Far from being isolated, Australia is directly tied to the lifelines of global trade, hosting shipping routes that carry energy supplies and goods between Asia, the Middle East, and beyond. This makes its ports, straits, and naval capabilities central to regional security (Gyngell & Wesley, 2007). Regarding the Indo-Pacific region, Australia’s proximity means it is regularly the first responder in regional crises, from natural disasters to humanitarian emergencies (McDougall, 2021). These factors demonstrate why Australia is not peripheral, but rather a frontline state in the shifting Indo-Pacific order.

Present-day governance under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese shows that middle power principles still shape Australia’s foreign policy. The Labor Government’s recent call to recognise the State of Palestine demonstrates Australia’s ability to take value-driven stances on global and humanitarian issues and shows that it is not fully constricted to security frameworks such as the US alliance, which align with Jordaan’s (2003) perception of middle powers as using diplomacy to shape world order.

For Australia to maintain diplomatic balance as a middle power under Ungerer’s (2007) definition as a regional stabiliser and multilateral advocate, soft-power leadership and investments in international development are essential. Unfortunately, in a world where threats are evolving, response and preparedness are also key (Wang, 2024). Yet, AUKUS risks aligning the region with the American alliance system and heightening its Anglophone identity, which will likely undermine Australia’s neutral credibility (Wang, 2024). If, however, AUKUS complements rather than overshadows Australia’s broader regional strategy, particularly its multilateral role in capacity building through ASEAN and Pacific Step-Up initiatives, Australia can maintain its credibility as an independent, principled, and trusted partner in the Indo-Pacific.

By leveraging its unique combination of geographic advantage, strong alliances, and values-driven engagement, Australia can continue to influence regional stability and uphold international norms, maintaining its status as a middle power and making contributions in the Indo-Pacific a source of national pride.

Bibliography

1. Australian Government 2019, ‘Stepping up Australia’s engagement with our Pacific family’, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed on 4^th August, 2025, available <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/stepping-up-australias-engagement-with-our-pacific-family.pdf>.

2. Bisley, N 2025, ‘The Quad, AUKUS and Australian security minilateralism: China’s rise and new approaches to security cooperation’, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 34, no. 154, pp. 564-576.

3. Buszynski, L 2025, ‘Australia, geopolitics, the Quad and the Indo Pacific’, Geopolitics and strategy: China, the Quad and the Southeast Asian Pivot, pp. 153-171.

4. Carr, A 2014, ‘Is Australia a middle power? A systemic impact approach’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 70-84.

5. Cheng, M 2022, ‘AUKUS: The changing dynamic and its regional implications’, European Journal of Development Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1-7.

6. Gyngell, A & Wesley, M 2007. Making Australian Foreign Policy (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.

7. Jordaan, E 2003, ‘The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers’, Politikon, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 165-181.

8. McDougall, D 2021, ‘Australia’s humanitarian response to disasters in the South Pacific’, Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 202-220.

9. Scott, D 2013, ‘Australia's embrace of the ‘Indo-Pacific’: new term, new region, new strategy?’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 425-448

10. Ungerer, C 2007, ‘The “middle power” concept in Australian foreign policy’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 538-551.

11. Wang, S 2024, ‘Role and threat: An assessment of Australia's South China sea policy amid great power rivalry’, Asian Perspective, vol. 48, no. 42, pp. 621-646.

12. Wulandari, M.H.E. and Saragih, H.M 2023, ‘Australia’s Pacific step-up foreign policy as a response to the increase of China’s influence in the Pacific’, Insignia: Journal of International Relations, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 228-256.

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