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The Paradox of America First: A Benign Hegemon Turning Predatory

  • Writer: Madison Carrino
    Madison Carrino
  • Apr 26
  • 7 min read

“America First”, are two words that defined US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy in his first term and his 2024 presidential campaign. Throughout his political career, the US President has vowed to put American interests first and foremost and end decades of policing world politics (The White House, 2025).


Trump has advocated for a more isolationist foreign policy, signaling US retreat from world politics, and promising to end wars. However, the beginning of 2026 saw US intervention in Venezuela and its controversial campaign in Iran, signaling regime change in these states. These actions are paradoxical and reflect the 2000s era of military interventions.


Unlike the military interventions of the Bush administration, Trump’s foreign policy in his second term is centered around extractionist principles and practices, prioritizing short-term material gains rather than long-term political stability. American scholar Stephen Walt (2026) has recently characterized US’ actions as predatory. A stark contrast to its historical reputation as a benign hegemon -a hegemon provides global public goods and stability in the international system (Mastanduno, 1997).


The current trajectory of the “America First” is not isolationism, but perhaps a turn to predatory unipolarity. America is gambling with its long-standing global stability for short-term material gains, which could potentially bring chaos and weakening to American hegemony and global order. 


Paradox of 2026: Unipolarity and America First

For the last three decades, the world has been operating in a unipolar balance of power, the US has been the sole great power. With its unmatched prowess, the US has the freedom of action to intervene in sovereign states and spread democracy and capitalism to former authoritarian states (Miller, 2025). The US acted as the leader and protector of the Liberal International Order.


However, according to Miller (2025), in the 2010s and 2020s, China and the BRICS economies have strengthened and expanded, propelling scholars and policymakers to believe that there might be a transition to a multipolar world and an inevitable decline of the US hegemony.


The rates that China was growing economically faster than the US scared American politicians. Trump expressed disappointment and championed for an “America First” foreign and trade policy. This strategy focused on bringing back industry to the US and minimizing economic dependence as well as a rhetorical commitment to ending and diverting from “endless wars” (Bazzi, 2026).


This term refers to the US’ prolonged military engagements in the Middle East, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have spanned decades and resulted in significant financial costs amounting to trillions of dollars, as well as substantial American casualties.

Thus, instead of utilizing multilateral trade policies and agreements, the US has started to seek to maximize its gains through bilateral treaties. Additionally, this nationalist framework challenged the NATO allies to contribute more.


Man in black suit and a fancy red tie. Photo by Sean Ferigan on Unsplash
Man in black suit and a fancy red tie. Photo by Sean Ferigan on Unsplash

Notably, the “America First” doctrine maintains the unipolar elements of protecting American interests such as building a strong military and defense capabilities (Rowe, 2018). But compared to the Bush administration, which centered on ideological democratization, the Trump administration seeks to monetize foreign policy and prioritize financial gains. This contrast is exemplified in the 5% commitment, NATO allies must invest 5% of GDP in defense (Hendrix, 2025). Simultaneously, in the economic domain, the heavy tariffs on the European Union amid increasing tensions and lower trade deficits (IISS, 2025; European Parliament, 2026). Nevertheless, like the Bush administration, Trump’s actions are about the US leading the world, but it is charging a fee for American security protections and market access.


While the administration’s foreign policy platform was built on ending “forever wars” and withdrawing from costly overseas entanglements, developments in 2026 appear to contradict this agenda. This tension exposes a clear paradox: an administration that once championed isolationism is now engaging in unilateral actions that risk escalating into another protracted conflict, reminiscent of Afghanistan and Iraq.


By engaging in these regime-changing and resource-driven interventions, the administration is perhaps distancing itself from the US’ historical role as a benign hegemon. Rather than using its strength and unipolar standing to stabilize global order and strengthen multilateral cooperation, the United States is utilizing its role to its advantage which could potentially disrupt global order and empower the further rise of adversaries.


This shift also aggravates transatlantic relations as traditional allies might abandon American guarantees and aid, consequently weakening American power.

Instead of ending military interventions, as promised by the Trump administration, the nationalist foreign policy doctrine traded its ideological mission of spreading democracy for transactional wars, including the securing of resources.


Interventions and Extractionism

Scholar Stephen Walt (2026, p.4.) described current America as a predatory hegamon, “[using] economic power, including threats of high tariffs, to enforce its will, and no longer rules out the use of military force, even against allies.”


The capturing of Maduro and America will “run” the Venezuelan government as well as oversee and control the development of oil reserves with proceeds flowing into US- controlled accounts suggest that the America First doctrine is about controlling the Western Hemisphere for American interests (Council on Foreign Relations, 2026; The White House, 2026). This action serves to reassert American dominance in both the economic and security domains. Furthermore, this once again demonstrates that the short-term gains are the central focus of this administration’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, the sustainability of this model remains a critical point of contention among analysts and strategists.


Despite its unclear and controversial motives, the recent events in Tehran most resemble 2000s unipolar era politics – unilateral military action with uncertainty of the duration of these operations. The Trump administration has given several flaky justifications for action in Iran and Venezuela alike. At times, they signal this is about regime-change or to solely eliminate nuclear capabilities and drug-trafficking operations (Thomas et al., 2026; Council on Foreign Relations, 2026). These abrupt and surprise actions have led the international community to question the future of global stability and the longevity of American hegemony.


Although Iran is a critical ally of both Russia and China, supplying drones and oil to these countries, proponents of the administration argue that targeting Iran would weaken both powers by disrupting these supply chains (Kagan, 2026). This, in turn, is seen as a way to constrain their capacity to expand further on the global stage. However, this argument is insufficient as it does not consider the other factors and how China and Russia could potentially use to its advantage.


Statue of Liberty. Photo by Ferdinand Stöhr on Unsplash
Statue of Liberty. Photo by Ferdinand Stöhr on Unsplash

According to Kagan (2026), Russia has oil which is the main export and profitable industry, China can easily purchase Russian oil and given that the US has lifted sanctions on Russian oil suggests that Russia could profit off US distractions in the Middle East and Latin America as well as capitalize on the global energy instability. Secondly, further escalation of military deployments to the Middle East could shift our focus from the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan and encourage Chinese military build-up. The America First foreign policy strategy is leading to a strategic overextension of military power that could possibly exhaust the US dominance and give Russia and China the breathing room to reshape the global order.


Allied Consequence

The most self-defeating factor of this shift from a benign hegemon to a predatory hegemon is the cost of division in its alliances. A common misunderstanding of American foreign policy and the origins of American power is not unique defense systems, but within allied and security cooperation and trust from its allies (Walt, 2026). For instance, European allies have refused to part-take in strikes against Iran and have signaled that this is the United States’ problem not theirs (Zabrowski 2026).


In recent years, European leaders have increasingly called for reducing their reliance on the United States, citing the volatility of its foreign policy. At the same time, shifting American attention away from Russia—widely seen as Europe’s most immediate threat (Walt, 2026; Kagan, 2026)—has deepened mistrust toward the United States and raised concerns about the durability of its global leadership.


The transactional and predatory nature of the current administration has tainted ‘’benign hegemon’’ reputation and threatens American and global security.

Without the trust of its allies—especially as global threats become more acute—the US risks bearing the burden of security alone. The erosion of these alliances undermines the very system of collective deterrence that has long underpinned Western security. In this sense, the America First doctrine reflects a fundamental miscalculation of the United States’ core strategic asset: its alliance network.


As we look toward the remainder of 2026, the danger is not in American weakness, but in displaying too much strength and might that turn its allies away and gives room for powerful adversaries to execute their expansionist plans. Instead of witnessing a traditional decline of America's power from another rising power, America is furthering the decline of its own will.


References

  1. Bazzi, M. (2026, March 1). Trump promised no wars. Now he’s a Bush-style regime change president. The Guardian; The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2026/mar/01/trump-promised-no-wars-now-hes-a-bush-style-regime-change-president

  2. Center for Preventive Action. (2026). U.S Confrontation with Venezuela. Global Conflict Tracker; Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/instability-venezuela

  3. Franco, A. (2026, February 6). Trump’s America First doctrine is remaking global diplomacy. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/2/6/trumps-america-first-doctrine-is-remaking-global-diplomacy

  4. Hendrix, C. S. (2025, February 5). Trump’s Five Percent Doctrine and NATO Defense Spending. PIIE. https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/trumps-five-percent-doctrine-and-nato-defense-spending

  5. International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2025). The looming transatlantic trade war. IISS. https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2025/05/the-looming-transatlantic-trade-war/

  6. Kagan, R. (2026, March 30). America is Now a Rogue Superpower. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/03/trump-us-power-iran/686567/

  7. Mastanduno, M. (1997). Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War. International Security, 27(4), 138–181.

  8. Miller, B. (2025). Unipolarity and the Transition to Post-Unipolarity: Explaining Behavior under Unipolarity and in the Post-Unipolar Era. Journal of Global Security Studies, 10(4). https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaf032

  9. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (2025). Defence expenditures and NATO’s 5% commitment. https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment

  10. European Parliament (2025). EU-US tariffs: tensions, trade deal and what could change. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20250210STO26801/eu-us-tariffs-tensions-trade-deal-and-what-could-change

  11. Popli, B. (2026, January 15). How Trump’s Foreign Policy Gambits Are Reshaping the World. Time. https://time.com/collections/davos-2026/7345543/trump-foreign-policy-second-term/

  12. Rowe, D. (2018). The Meaning of “America First” - Kenyon Alumni Magazine. Bulletin.kenyon.edu. https://bulletin.kenyon.edu/article/the-meaning-of-america-first/

  13. The White House. (2025, February 21). America First Investment Policy. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/america-first-investment-policy/

  14. Thomas, C., Blanchard, C., Sharp, J., & Zanotti, J. (2026). U.S. Conflict with Iran. Congressional Research Service. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48887/R48887.1.pdf

  15. Walt, S. (2026). The Predatory Hegemon: How Trump Wields American Power. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/predatory-hegemon-walt

  16. White House. (2026, January 10). Safeguarding Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People. The White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/safeguarding-venezuelan-oil-revenue-for-the-good-of-the-american-and-venezuelan-people/

  17. Zaborowski, M. (2026, March 25). Transatlantic Spilt Over Iran: The Alliance Under Strain.

    Globsec. https://www.globsec.org/commentaries/transatlantic-split-over-iran-nato-under-strain


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