Democracy or Co-optation? Judicial Elections in Mexico and the Future of the Judiciary in Latin America

Last Sunday, June 1st, Mexico held its first-ever judicial election. Mexicans went to the polls to elect judges, magistrates, and justices of the Supreme Court of Justice, voting for a total of 896 positions (1). This vote is part of a constitutional reform promoted by the ruling party, MORENA, whose objective is to democratize the judiciary through accountability, transparency, and the elimination of impunity.

The government claims that economic interests influence the judiciary, hinder the executive branch's social initiatives, and have eroded its legitimacy among the public. Therefore, the reform proposes that "the people" directly elect judges, breaking with the traditional system of technical appointments endorsed by the Senate. This new reform removes key requirements, such as proven professional experience, and permits individuals without judicial experience to compete for positions.

A relevant international example is judicial reform in Poland. Since 2015, the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party has implemented reforms that increase executive control over the appointment of judges and the oversight of the judiciary (2). These reforms have drawn criticism from the European Union for undermining judicial independence and threatening the rule of law. Changes in Poland, such as the modification of the National Council of the Judiciary and the restructuring of the Supreme Court, have raised concerns about the politicization of the judicial system and its impact on human rights.

This Polish scenario serves as a warning about the risks of allowing political power to exert excessive influence over the judicial system, a situation that parallels the proposed reforms in Mexico.

However, many academics and constitutional experts believe these elections do not represent a democratic advance. This model could violate judicial independence, lead to the politicization of the justice system, and weaken human rights protections in the country. International organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) led an Electoral Observation Mission to evaluate and analyze the conduct of these elections (3). In their report, they express concern about the direction these elections could take in the future and do not recommend that other countries in the region replicate this model (2025). The popular election of judges is not a widespread practice in Latin America, so the Mexican case becomes a historical milestone and a test to verify the functionality of these new elections.

Photo by Tim Mossholder on Unsplash

According to the OAS Preliminary Report (2025), this electoral process has been profoundly complex, and the observed results have left much to be desired. Citizen participation was 13%, an extremely low percentage, explained by the complexity of the process and the government's lack of clarity in explaining to the population what this election entailed (4). We observed two important elements that explain the lack of participation: first, the complexity of the process and the limited outreach of Mexican society; and second, the percentage of the population that does not support these elections.

An autonomous judiciary is essential to guarantee human rights, especially in contexts of violence, corruption, or repression. In Mexico, the courts are fundamental to the defense of victims of enforced disappearances, persecuted journalists, and Indigenous communities affected by infrastructure projects.

However, if judges must respond to popular votes, political campaigns, opaque financing, or partisan pressure, they could cease to act as guarantors of rights and become political operators. These elections could violate Mexico's international human rights commitments, breaking with established standards regarding access to independent and technical justice.

Mexico faces an institutional crossroads. The popular election of judges may appear to be a democratic advance, but in practice, it poses serious risks to the balance of power, judicial impartiality, and the effective protection of human rights. Rather than electing judges by vote, the country needs to strengthen selection mechanisms with technical, transparent criteria free from political interests. Judicial independence is not an obstacle to democracy, but an indispensable condition for its functioning.

What happens in Mexico will resonate throughout Latin America. If the reform succeeds and ushers in a judicial system subordinated to political power or electoral whims, it could open the door to a new wave of authoritarianism disguised as popular participation. As regional history has shown, when justice becomes hostage to politics, rights are always the first to lose.

Will Mexico be able to find a balance that protects its democracy and guarantees justice for all?

Bibliography

1. American Convention on Human Rights . (n.d.). https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/spanish/basicos2.htm 

2. Duncan, A.K. (2022, July 7 ). The Collapse of Judicial Independence in Poland . Judiciary | The Scholarly Journal About The Judiciary. https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/the-collapse-of-judicial-independence-in-poland-a-cautionary-tale/#:~:text=A%20finales%20de%202019%2C%20 the%20function%C3%B3n%20of%20judicial%20power.&text=The%20new%20law%2C%20known%20popularly,the%20platform%20of the%20ruling%20party .

3. National Electoral Institute. (n.d.). 2025 Federal Judicial Branch Election - National Electoral Institute. https://ine.mx/eleccion-del-poder-judicial-de-la-federacion-2025/

4. Lastiri, D. (n.d.). Judicial Reform: How Many Judges Will We Elect in 2025? Proceso. https://www.proceso.com.mx/nacional/2024/10/8/reforma-judicial-cuantos-juzgadores-vamos-elegir-en-2025-338188.html 

5. OAS. (2025). Preliminary Report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission for the Judicial Branch Elections in Mexico. In OAS. https://www.oas.org/fpdb/press/2025_MEXICO_MOE_Elecciones_Judiciales_-Informe_Preliminart_ENG.pdf 

6. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (n.d.). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UN. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

7. Parra, M. (2025, April 10). Positions to be elected in the 2025 Judicial Branch election. National Electoral Institute. https://ine.mx/cargos-pj-2025/ 

8. Information portal for candidates for judicial positions in Mexico City. (n.d.). https://www.eleccionpoderjudicial.cdmx.gob.mx/ 

9. Welle, D. (2023, June 5). European Court of Justice Declares Polish Judicial Reform Illegal. dw.com. https://www.dw.com/en/european-court-declares-polish-judicial-reform-illegal/a-65830261

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