War, Peace, and TRIPP: The U.S. Is Trading a Win in the Caucasus for War in Iran

Of all the wars Trump claims to have resolved, the peace initiative between Azerbaijan and Armenia may be the most strategically significant. Azerbaijan and Armenia have been alternating between hot wars and frozen conflicts for the last 37 years. This prolonged fighting has left the South Caucasus divided, limiting the region’s potential and making it vulnerable to Russia. However, with Russia’s overextension in Ukraine and the international race for critical minerals, the Caucasus have a window of opportunity to reassert themselves as a major transnational trade corridor.

When invited to mediate Azerbaijan and Armenia’s peace process, the U.S. was also given an opportunity. In one move, the U.S. advanced peace, secured the ground work for critical supply chains, and counterbalanced Chinese influence. However, the U.S. war in Iran, and the likely chaos to follow, has the potential to undo this achievement. Like Russia before it, the U.S. may have traded a strategic position in the Caucasus for a probable loss in a war of choice. This has put Azerbaijan and Armenia in a precarious position; how they proceed may have long-term implications for the region and the global balance of power.  

A Protracted Conflict - In Brief

Under the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave of ethnic Armenians within Azerbaijan, was made an autonomous region. In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh declared its intention to join Armenia, resulting in a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia brokered a ceasefire in 1994, but the territorial dispute was not resolved and the two countries remained locked in a frozen conflict until 2020 when a full war broke out. During which, Azerbaijan reclaimed large swaths of territory and encircled Nagorno-Karabakh (International Crisis Group, 2023).

Russia sent peacekeepers to secure a corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Despite the peacekeepers, the Azerbaijani military blockaded the corridor, risking a humanitarian crisis. As the international community called for the end of the blockade, Azerbaijan made a military incursion into Nagorno-Karabakh to “eradicate terrorists” (Light, 2023). The operation ended with Azerbaijan gaining full control of the Karabakh region and thousands of Armenians fleeing to Armenia as refugees. A year later, Armenian President Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev began bilateral negotiations for a peace settlement. In 2025, they agreed to work with the Trump administration (International Crisis Group, 2025).

The Middle Corridor

Although they do not receive regular international coverage, the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, are critical in the geopolitical balance of power. Historically, they were part of the Silk Road. Today, they are a keystone of the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TCITP). The Middle Corridor connects China and East Asia to Europe. It goes through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, where it splits. One route crosses the Black Sea and the other goes through Türkiye. As of 2026, it is the shortest and safest route, as it bypasses Russia, Iran, and Yemen. It also provides access to Central Asia- a landlocked region that holds some of the world’s largest supplies of critical minerals, oil, and natural gas (Asian Development Bank, 2010).

Russia has long objected to the Middle Corridor (Dudnik, 2013). The Corridor is competition for Russia’s Northern Route, which also runs East to West and intersects with the North-South route that connects Russia to Iran (Blinova, 2025). However, since Russia’s war in Ukraine, the Northern Route has become less secure due to sanctions and Russia has not been in a position to protest the development of the Middle Corridor. Particularly, because China has been its largest investor (Sabirova, 2025).

China owns several mines and processing facilities in Central Asia (Pannier, 2025). If China controls the Middle Corridor, it will be able to consolidate its supply chains, solidifying its monopoly over critical minerals. The EU is the Corridor’s second-largest investor (Sabirova, 2025). In contrast to China, the EU aims to diversify its supply chains. Through an equitable Middle Corridor, the EU will secure direct access to Central Asian markets, reducing its dependency on China for critical minerals (European Commission, 2024). Other major investors include the Netherlands, Türkiye, and the U.S. (Sabirova, 2025). 

These opposing objectives make the Middle Corridor a crucial piece in a great power competition. Georgia’s shift away from the EU, has tipped the scales in China’s favour. According to Civil Georgia (2024) Georgia has suspended accession talks with the EU, and it has taken an uncritical approach to Chinese investment. One example is the Anaklia Black Sea port. Georgia awarded the port’s tender, along with 49% shares, to a U.S.-sanctioned Chinese company with a history of problematic work (Transparency International Georgia, 2024). This has highlighted a need to diversify the Middle Corridor to include passageways through Armenia, as well as Georgia.

Trump’s TRIPP

In August 2025, Presidents Pashinyan and Aliyev met in Washington, D.C., to sign an initial agreement, paving the way for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The main thrust of the agreement is an acknowledgement of the 1991 territorial borders and a compromise on the Zangezur Corridor (Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], 2025). 

Donald Trump. Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

Azerbaijan wants to construct a 25-mile (40-kilometre) corridor, the Zangezur Corridor, through Armenia to connect to its autonomous enclave Nakhchivan (Avdaliani, (2025). Armenia sees an Azerbaijani-controlled corridor as a threat to its territory. Their compromise was to give the U.S. rights to build and manage the Zangezur Corridor and rename it the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) (Crisis Group International, 2025). This will give the U.S. controlling shares of the TRIPP Development Company for 49 years, with an option to extend for another 50 years (U.S. Department of State, 2026).

The TRIPP plan not only connects Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, but it also completes a larger Middle Corridor passage, connecting Türkiye to the Caspian Sea. This deal ensures U.S. access to the Middle Corridor, and in turn, access to Central Asia. If successful, TRIPP will encourage further U.S., EU, and Turkic investment in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which will further balance Russia’s influence and China’s resource monopoly. The additional route will also diversify the Middle Corridor, immunising it against blockages, bottlenecks, and political or economic extortion.

Too Close for Comfort

While many countries in the region see the benefits of TRIPP, Iran is not one of them. The TRIPP passage runs along Iran’s northern border and Iran has raised concerns (Iran International, 2025). An American-controlled corridor could cut off Armenia from Iran and Iran from the North-South trade route. The project gives the U.S. undue influence in the region and opens the door for US military presence on Iran’s border. The Iranian regime vocalised support for Azerbaijani and Armenian peace, but the Iranian foreign minister Velayati also said, "This corridor will not become a passage owned by Trump, but rather a graveyard for Trump's mercenaries," (Hafezi and Osborn, 2025). 

At the time of the initial talks, there were several major hurdles in the peace process. An aggressive Iran was just one of many potential problems. However, now that the U.S. and Israel are engaged in a war with Iran, the calculation has changed.

War

The success of TRIPP is contingent on the outcome of the war with Iran. A drawn-out regional war in the Middle East, a civil war in Iran, or even a weakened Islamic Republic, will raise the profile of the Middle Corridor. In the first days of the war, the skies closed over the Gulf and thousands of planes were diverted through the Caucasus (Hooker, 2026). With the closure of the Straits of Hormuz, the demand for shipping containers along the Middle Corridor increased by 450-500% from the same time last year (Heybatov, 2026).

Conversely, these same outcomes undermine TRIPP and U.S. involvement in the Corridor. In the case of an Iranian civil war, TRIPP is close enough to the border that spillover will put it at risk. If the war continues to expand and Türkiye or Azerbaijan becomes involved, TRIPP would be in the middle of the conflict. If the Iranian regime stays in power, TRIPP could become a potential target. Without a U.S.-amenable government and relative stability in Iran, a U.S.-led TRIPP will be a liability for the U.S. and the Caucasus. 

Conclusion

The outcome of the war in Iran is uncertain, but TRIPP will likely be delayed indefinitely. However, the Armenian and Azerbaijani path to peace was not started by the U.S., nor does it hinge on U.S. involvement. The current demand for the Middle Corridor provides the means for Azerbaijan and Armenia to establish connectivity on a bilateral basis. Though, to take full advantage of the moment, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia should manage the Corridor as a cooperative bloc and balance the influence of foreign actors. With a unified approach, they could improve the viability of both the Middle Corridor and the North-South passage. Instead of being an object of great power competitions, the South Caucasus could be a strategic player, controlling the crossroads of the world.

References

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2. Avdaliani, E. (2025, August 13). Trump’s Road TRIPP Delivers a Deal. Centre for European Policy Analysis. https://cepa.org/article/trumps-road-tripp-delivers-a-peace-deal/

3. Blinova, E. (2025, August 7). US control over Zangezur corridor could spell danger to BRICS. Sputnik. https://sputnikglobe.com/20250807/us-control-over-zangezur-corridor-could-spell-danger-to-brics-1122572010.html

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21. U.S. Department of State. (2026). TRIPP implementation framework. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/TRIPP-Implementation-Framework.pdf

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