Political Violence in Mexico: The Cost of Inaction
- Miriam Cornejo Rodriguez
- Dec 25, 2025
- 4 min read
Political violence in Mexico has become an alarming constant, reflecting a deep institutional crisis and government inaction. According to recent data, 253 cases of political violence were recorded during the first half of the year, including 112 assassinations of political figures (Vela, 2025). These figures not only demonstrate a problem of insecurity, but also a deeper phenomenon reflecting the territorial capture by organized crime, as well as the structural weakness of institutions.
In recent years, scholars and security experts have characterized the crisis in Mexico not only as a surge in violence but also as a process of political cartelization—that is, the gradual integration and influence of organized crime within political institutions and processes, such as elections. According to Ley (2025), in an interview conducted by EstefanÃa Camacho for TecScience, "Party alternation and mayorships affect the logic of violence... In this process, organized crime has become a political actor with political interest, even if not interested in substituting the state".Â
Political cartelization happens when criminal groups not only bribe politicians but also reshape party platforms, candidate choices, local government decisions, and other areas. This process has altered the country's political landscape, turning democratic processes into violent situations where criminal groups either negotiate power or impose their control.
Many of these attacks happen at the municipal level, where government power is more dispersed and fragile. According to a report by Integralia Consultores (2025), 79% of victims of political violence are local officials, candidates, or former municipal leaders. This distribution is no coincidence. Organized crime sees local governments as the most profitable and feasible entry point for enforcing its rules, controlling budgets and security forces, and thereby gaining real influence over governance.
Political cartelization is most evident at the municipal level, where institutional fragility, limited budgets, and weak oversight create conditions that criminal organizations exploit systematically.
This process generally unfolds through three mechanisms. First, control over candidate selection, where criminal groups finance campaigns or coerce parties into nominating individuals aligned with their interests. Second, budgetary capture, achieved by influencing or directly managing municipal spending—particularly in public works, security contracts, and permits—turning local governments into financial resources. Third, co-optation of local security forces, which allows criminal groups to operate with impunity and use police agencies as tools for enforcement rather than protection. These dynamics turn many municipalities into operational extensions of criminal governance, rather than autonomous democratic institutions.
The Mexican government has failed to effectively curb this violence, enabling criminal groups to use murder, threats, and intimidation as tools of political coercion. Impunity and institutional weakness promote the normalization of violence as just another part of local power struggles.
Beyond the human cost, political violence weakens Mexican democracy. When candidates, local authorities, or aspirants are murdered or threatened, the election stops being fair. The violence is not just tactical but strategic, as it helps sustain the ongoing corrupt structure. Those operating within organized crime try to ensure governments are compliant and gain allies; those who don't comply are seen as a threat to be eliminated.

This increase in violence cannot be solely blamed on failed operations or a lack of police training. It involves a more complex set of factors, including corruption and institutional capture. Organized crime not only attacks but also infiltrates political power. The State's inaction in response to this situation is a structural failure that empowers criminal actors and erodes public trust.
The consequences of political cartelization extend far beyond electoral cycles. When criminal organizations shape candidate viability, public spending, and local enforcement capacities, the very foundations of democratic governance erode. Voters face limited or coerced choices, policy decisions become subordinated to criminal interests, and entire regions function under parallel or hybrid forms of authority. This distorts federalism by creating territories where the rule of law is effectively replaced by criminal arbitration. Moreover, the normalization of these arrangements undermines citizen trust, fuels impunity, and reinforces a system where violence is not an anomaly but a mechanism of political negotiation. Understanding political violence without addressing cartelization means overlooking the structural forces that keep Mexico trapped in a cycle of insecurity and democratic decay.
Confronting this crisis requires more than just speeches and superficial operations. It calls for strengthening institutions from the ground up and filling the power vacuums that the government has overlooked, allowing organized crime to take hold. A fundamental change in Mexico’s leadership is urgently needed to stop the normalization of alliances between the government and organized crime. Politics must shift its focus back to its core purpose: protecting citizens and building a safe and prosperous future for Mexican society.
Bibliography
Camacho, E. (2025, March 24). Organized crime is already a political actor... just not looking to replace the state. Interview with S. Ley. TecScience. https://tecscience.tec.mx/en/human-social/how-does-violence-influences-democracies/
Integralia Consultores. (2025, July 27
de julio). Violencia polÃtica en México. Enero – junio 2025. Integralia Consultores. https://integralia.com.mx/web/reporte-de-violencia-politica_1s2025_vf-pdf/Navarrete Hernández, D. (2018). El impacto de la corrupción polÃtica y la violencia en la inversión privada estatal de México. En VIII Congreso Internacional en Sistemas de Producción, EconomÃa y Desarrollo Sostenible. CDSA. https://cdsa.aacademica.org/000-036/396.pdf
Oteiza San Segundo, A. (2020). Capital social y capital polÃtico. Las redes del poder y el desarrollo regional en México [Tesis doctoral, Universidad Complutense de Madrid]. Repositorio Institucional Docta. https://docta.ucm.es/entities/publication/6672600c-ad9e-4caa-bd32-9992332efae0
Reynoso, V., & Córdova, M. E. (2015). Profesionalización y cartelización de los partidos polÃticos: el caso de México. Revista Mexicana de Ciencias PolÃticas y Sociales, 60(224), 231–254. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2448-492X(15)30009-4Â
Vela, D. S. (2025, July 28). Van 112 asesinatos polÃticos en el primer semestre de 2025: Integralia. El Financiero. https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/2025/07/28/van-112-asesinatos-politicos-en-el-primer-semestre-de-2025-integralia/
Disclaimer
The opinions expressed herein belong solely to the columnist and do not represent the official position of our think-tank. Humanotions cannot be held liable for any consequences arising from this content. Content published on Humanotions may contain links to third-party sources. Humanotions is not responsible for the content of these external links. Please refer to our Legal Notices & Policies page for legal details and our Guidelines For Republishing page for republication terms.









