Fight for Autonomy: The Corsican Conflict

On the 2nd of March 2022, in a cell prison on the outskirts of the French city of Arles, Franck Elong Abè, a Cameroonian Islamist, is strangling his inmate over an argument on religion. Choking between his hands, there is a 61-year-old Corsican nationalist. Abè is unaware of it, but he just re-ignited the fire of a conflict that lasted for more than 40 years. After 19 days in the coma, the victim was declared dead. His name was Yvan Colonna (1).

According to a parliamentary investigation and report, the treatment of Colonna had been particularly harsh, and the authorities have been attributed the responsibility for Colonna’s death (2). His inmate, Abe, had been subject to a psychiatric evaluation, which found him particularly troubled, but no action had been taken, leaving Colonna vulnerable to Abé’s erratic behavior (2). Yvan’s homicide took 13 painful minutes, under camera surveillance, and yet no authority intervened, leaving the Corsican to a slow, painful death (2).

The day after the incident, protests and riots sweep the island of Corsica. Ajaccio, Bastia, Calvi, and all the main cities of the island are taken over by protesters of all ages and walks of life. The protests turn violent and evolve into riots, and the gendarmes are taken by assault, with incendiary attacks on the headquarters of the French armed forces (3). What was thought to be a long-forgotten name, the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC), released a communication, expressing its support for the protestors and foreshadowing a return to the armed struggle (4). The people of Corsica are enraged by the carelessness of the prison guards, they ask themselves how it could be possible that nobody intervened in stopping Abé from killing Colonna.

One may ask how the death of a single imprisoned Coriscan militant could spark such mass mobilizations. To answer this question, it is necessary to clarify that Yvan Colonna’s story is deeply intertwined with the recent history of his land of birth and its relationship with the French state.

Colonna’s death has become the symbol of a grievance that sees the Corsican people fighting for their autonomy, their cultural emancipation, and their desire to find a way towards development and out of poverty and exclusion (5).

A Background on Yvan

Who was Yvan Colonna? Colonna was born in 1960 in the city of Ajaccio, to a Corsican father and a Breton mother. Following his high school graduation in Nice, he abandoned his studies, resettled in the Corsican village of Cargese, and became a goat herder to sustain himself. During his permanence on the island, Colonna joined the lines of several guerrilla organizations that act under variations of the name FLNC (Fronte di Liberazione Nazionale di a Corsica) (2). In 2003, the independentist militant was arrested as the primary suspect for the assassination of the prefect Calude Erignác and was condemned to life imprisonment in 2011(3).

His arrest and condemnation were just one of the many cases of nationalists imprisoned during the Corsican conflict, which led to more than 140 deaths, many more injured, and numerous violent attacks that brought fear and uncertainty to the island south of France (5).

The Origins of the Corsican Armed Struggle

How did we get here? Starting with the island’s identity is strongly influenced by its historical relations with Italy, or more specifically, its pre-unification entities. Since the 11th century, Corsica was first ruled by the Republic of Pisa and afterward by the Republic of Genoa (6). This period of Italian rule strongly influenced the island, bringing Italian as a widespread language for the inhabitants, which then developed into the Corsican language (7). The Corsican language is still widely spoken on the island but is currently listed by the UN as endangered (8), with France never signing the European charter for the protection of minority languages (9).

Photo by Florian Olivo on Unsplash

Going back to history, in the year 1755, led by the father of the nation, Pasquale Paoli, the Corsican Republic was proclaimed after years of struggle to obtain independence from the Republic of Genoa. Despite the proclamation of a constitution, the hopes for an independent and emancipated Corsica are crushed in the ‘Battle of Ponte Novu’, where the Corsican Army of Paoli is defeated by the French Army, marking the beginning of French control on the island (6).

Jumping forward to 1957, Algeria obtained independence from France, displacing many French settlers, the so-called ‘pied-noir’ (13). Many of the pied-noirs are then resettled in Corsica, disrupting the Corsican farming market through land grabbings aided by the French state (13).

The rage of the local population grew, culminating in the siege of a pied-noir-owned wine cellar in 1975, where a group of nationalists took over a resettler’s farm, ending with the arrests of the militants (19). A year later, the FLNC was born, and the Corsican Conflict began.

 

Understanding the FLNC

What even is the FLNC? If somebody looks it up on Google, they will find pictures of masked men with guns and flags, akin to other groups such as the Basque ETA and the Irish IRA.

This paramilitary group has not been unified into one organized army but is rather composed of different groups with similar names, which have split, unified, and died throughout the years. Despite the internal divisions, the claims of the groups have been rather consistent and shared between them, often with their objectives stated in ‘communiques’ (13). Those being:

●      Land reform to end the unfair tourist and farming estates,

●      Devolution of power to the Corsican department (either through independence or increased autonomy, depending on the group),

●      Recognition of the Corsican people’s national rights,

●      Removal of instruments of French colonialism. (13)

The FLNC has carried out bombings of second-homes of French mainlanders (10) in Corsica and has not shied away from assassinations of prominent figures of the French state, both on the island and on the mainland. Many attacks have also hit infrastructure and French settlers on the island (10).

Despite the violence fueling the conflict, the FLNC has gathered widespread support from the public. In Corsica, according to polls, the majority of the population supports greater autonomy (53%), while those who support outright independence are a position shared by a sensibly smaller portion of the public (35%) (11).

The French Response

The French state is known to be a highly centralized one, due to Jacobine state theory (12) and a resulting institutional setup that dates back to the creation of the French state and the French Revolution. For this reason, the response of the government in Paris has been to suppress  the violent groups with police and armed forces (13,14).

The concessions of autonomy to the island and its people have often been limited, with the creation of a ‘Corsican Assembly’ which has limited regulatory powers and is devoid of legislative ones (13). Paris has injected the island with a security apparatus aimed at bringing down the FLNC, failing in its aims, as the groups are still active with more violent operations at the time of writing (11).

Corsica is the poorest of the European French departments, with insufficient development and, lack of social mobility, and plagued by the rising cost of housing and living (15).

Settlers from the Mainland buy cheap land on the island, building second homes for holidays and tourism, which are not inhabited for most of the year, and that skyrocket the price of ever more scarce houses for the local population (15). For these reasons, the recent attacks of the FLNC have mostly targeted the mainlanders’ tourist infrastructure (11).

As of today, Paris has given concessions to the island only after the heightening of tensions and attacks by the nationalists, as the Corsicans have little say through the state institutions (16). The only language spoken by the Paris administration seems the one of war and hard securitization, spending money and resources on the armed forces, rather than engaging in political and economic talks with the local population, which could resolve the issues peacefully while limiting the support for nationalist guerrillas.

Hearing the needs of this small minority, and entering into talks to resolve the griefs of the Corsicans is the most efficient way to prevent a further escalation of violence (16). However, the state seems to be far away from a further program of decentralization, especially given the instability of the current government in Paris.

The focus on the FLNC has led to the growth of a new foe for both France and Corsica: the mafia. During the years in which the French security apparatus was busy tackling the separatist groups, it overlooked the process of infiltration of mafias in splinter paramilitaries of the FLNC (17). Directing all the security efforts towards the nationalists allowed organized criminality to grow and act almost undisturbed on the island, leading to the highest homicide rate in France (3.7 murders for 100.000 inhabitants) (18).

What now?

If France wants to keep Corsica free from conflict and avoid further escalations of violence, several actions need to be taken.

1. First and foremost, seeing the geographical, social, and economic challenges of the island, France needs to deepen and speed up the process of devolution of legislative powers from the central government to the Corsican department through the Corsican Assembly. Such distinct challenges that Corsica faces nowadays can only be tackled by competent local administrators with in-depth knowledge of the local context.

2. The government in Paris needs to recognize the specificity of the Corsican society, with the first action needed being the recognition of bilingualism of Corsican regional institutions. This would constitute a first symbolic step towards the appeasement of the island’s society and French political institutions.

3. The security administration of the French state needs to modify its strategy on securitization, switching from heavy-handed military and police action to focusing on the economic and societal issues of the local population.

4. The French state should redirect its focus towards regional economic and infrastructure development in accordance with the local administration.

5. The French security forces have to redirect their focus towards the debilitation of the local organized crime organizations.

6. The French state should enter a dialogue regarding the economic disparities present on the island caused by the tourism industry and the re-settlement of pied-noir.

Bibliography

1. Schofield, H. (2022, March 21). Yvan Colonna: Corsican nationalist dies after jihadist jail attack. Www.bbc.com. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60830052

2.  Erturk, N. A. (2022). Authorities found responsible for Corsican activist’s death in prison: French parliamentary report. Aa.com.tr. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/authorities-found-responsible-for-corsican-activists-death-in-prison-french-parliamentary-report/2910445

3.  Abboud, L. (2022, March 18). Corsica riots cause a headache for Macron’s election campaign. @FinancialTimes; Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/d2013dce-f571-4b49-9f3e-388e71a80caf

4. Padovani, G., & Colonna, J.-F. (2023, March 21). Le FLNC rend hommage, met en garde et revendique dans une nouvelle communication. Corsematin.com; Corse Matin. https://www.corsematin.com/articles/le-flnc-rend-hommage-met-en-garde-et-revendique-dans-une-nouvelle-communication-139270

5. Ramsay, R. (2025). The Corsican Time-bomb. Google Books. https://books.google.nl/books?hl=it&lr=&id=oMVRAQAAIAAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=the+corsican+time+bomb&ots=p3ScL5Vkuz&sig=LGSrGzrL1-TB7B1q4PyjCGkryC4&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=the%20corsican%20time%20bomb&f=false

6.  Carrington, D. (1973). The Corsican Constitution of Pasquale Paoli (1755-1769). The English Historical Review, 88(348), 481–503. http://www.jstor.org/stable/564654

7. Jaffe, A. (2013). Ideologies in action: Language politics on Corsica (Vol. 3). Walter de Gruyter.

8. Moseley, Christopher; Nicolas, A. (2010). Atlas of the world's languages in danger / editor-in-Chief, Christopher Moseley ; cartographer, Alexandre Nicolas. Memory of peoples series (3rd ed. entirely revised, enlarged and updated. ed.). Paris: UNESCO, Intangible Cultural Heritage Section. ISBN 978-92-3-104095-5.

9. Dorfmann, H. (2021). Parliamentary question | discriminatory decision by the french constitutional council against speakers of regional and minority languages | E-004408/2021 | european parliament. Europa.eu. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2021-004408_EN.html

10. Redazione Rainews. (2023, October 9). Notte di esplosioni in Corsica, rivendicazione del Fronte di Liberazione Nazionale. RaiNews. https://www.rainews.it/articoli/2023/10/notte-di-esplosioni-in-corsica-rivendicazione-del-fronte-di-liberazione-nazionale-cc4d52ae-f8f6-4de7-9185-400b19c3fdbd.html

11. Corse Matin. (2022, March 14). Les Français favorables à un statut d’autonomie pour l’île. Corse Matin. https://www.corsematin.com/articles/les-francais-favorables-a-un-statut-dautonomie-pour-lile-124144

12. Mathews, J. (2023). France: Too central for democracy? | international democracy community. Democracy.community. https://www.democracy.community/stories/france-too-central-democracy

13. Daftary, F. (2000). Insular autonomy : A framework for conflict settlement?a comparative study of corsica and the åland islands. Vifapol.de; ECMI - European Centre for Minority Issues. https://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1889/

14. Merkl, P. (2023). 1. Approaches to the Study of Political Violence. In P. Merkl (Ed.), Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations (pp. 19-60). Berkeley: University of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520328044-002

15. OECD. (2024). Diagnosis of Corsica’s attractiveness in the new global environment. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/10/rethinking-regional-attractiveness-in-the-new-global-environment-case-studies_fbca2f00/diagnosis-of-corsica-s-attractiveness-in-the-new-global-environment_21ac655a/cb2d536b-en.pdf

16. Germann, M., & Sambanis, N. (2021). Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating Conflict over Self-Determination. International Organization, 75(1), 178–203. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27104631

17. Briquet, JL. (2010). “Drift into Mafiadom”? Political Violence and Criminality in the Corsican Nationalist Movement. In: Briquet, JL., Favarel-Garrigues, G. (eds) Organized Crime and States. The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230110038_9

18. Rouquette, P. (2025, February 17). En Corse, l’emprise de la mafia dénoncée après la mort “par erreur” de Chloé. France 24; FRANCE 24. https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20250217-mafia-corse-emprise-crime-organise-mort-par-erreur-de-chloe-collectif-antimafia-taux-meurtre

19. Esclangon-Morin, V. (2007). Les rapatriés d'Afrique du Nord de 1956 à nos jours. L'Harmattan. pp. 235–36. ISBN 978-2-296-02834-0.Crettiez, Xavier. "La question corse". Vingtième Siècle. 66 (April–June 2000): 193–94

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